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THE ENDOGENOUS FOURTH AMENDMENT:




Osagie K. Obasogiet & Zachary Newmantt
If the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect citizens
from law enforcement abusing its powers, why are so many
unarmed Americans killed? Traditional understandings ofthe
Fourth Amendment suggest hat it has an exogenous effect on
police use of force, Le., that the Fourth Amendment provides
the ground rules for how and when law enforcement can use
force that police departments turn into use-of-force policies
that ostensibly limit police violence. In this Article, we ques-
tion whether this exogenous understanding of the Fourth
Amendment in relation to excessive force claims is accurate by
engaging in an empirical assessment of the use-of-force poli-
cies in the seventy-five largest American cities. We find that
rather than translating Fourth Amendment standards into
specific rules for police and clear protections for citizens in a
"top down" fashion, use-of-force policies largely regurgitate
the Fourth Amendment's ambiguities concerning what is "rea-
sonable" while inserting additional equivocations that reflect
the interests of law enforcement. This empirical evidence,
along with a doctrinal examination of how use-of-force policies
are used when presented to federal courts, gives rise to a new
understanding of the Fourth Amendment, where self-serving
police understandings of excessive force are embedded in use-
of-force policies and shape the meaning of reasonable force.
These policies are often relied upon, referenced, or deferred to
by federal courts as a lawful implementation of an ambiguous
Fourth Amendment. Thus, rather than the Fourth Amendment
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having an exogenous effect on use-of-force policies and police
behavior, this Article argues that federal courts often embrace
an endogenous, or "bottom-up" meaning of excessive force
where the policy preferences of police departments are rear-
ticulated as constitutional law. Thisfindingfrom our empirical
work provides a new way to understand why use-of-force
policies and the Fourth Amendment have been ineffective in
combating excessive force by the police. Moreover, this endog-
enous understanding of Fourth Amendment excessive force
jurisprudence opens up new avenues for legal reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile killings of unarmed Black people by the
police and resulting social movements have brought renewed
attention to the constitutional limits on police use of force dur-
ing arrests or investigatory stops-an area governed by the
Fourth Amendment. Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has
1282 [Vol. 104:1281
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engaged in a series of decisions-notably Tennessee v. Garner1
and Graham v. Connor-that, on their face, appear to provide
greater protection for the public by limiting police discretion.
Garner holds that police may not use deadly force to apprehend
fleeing suspects, while the Court in Graham refines the consti-
tutional boundaries of police use of force by stating that such
actions must be reasonable. In this context, the Court and
legal scholars have largely framed the Fourth Amendment as a
legal shield against police abuse and mistreatment or as a re-
pository of legal rights that protect citizens from undue State
power while being exogenous to on-the-ground police/commu-
nity interactions. Although commentators have raised con-
cerns over whether these constitutional provisions offer
enough tactical guidance to constrain police power, the overall
sentiment concerning the Fourth Amendment as a set of exter-
nal governing rules that restrain police action is largely ac-
cepted in legal doctrine and traditional scholarly literature.
It would be expected that this aspect of the Fourth Amend-
ment and its interpretative turn toward "reasonableness" since
Grahan3 would provide community members basic, if not
meaningful, protections against police violence-or, at the very
least, hold police officers and departments accountable after
the fact when there is clear evidence of abuse. Many police
departments have aligned their policies with this judicial un-
derstanding of the constitutional limitations placed on the po-
lice and have developed other tactical measures thought to be
commensurate with the Court's holdings.4
Yet, police violence remains a constant, if not growing,
problem in many communities.5 Despite recent media atten-
1 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
2 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
3 Id. at 395 ("Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis,
and hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-
deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonable-
ness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach.").
4 See, e.g., BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEP'T, BAKERSFIELD PD POLICY MANUAL 60
(2017) ("[Elvery member of this department is expected to use these guidelines to
make [use-of-force] decisions in a professional, impartial and reasonable
manner.").
5 See, e.g., Carl Bialik, Why Are So Many Black Americans Killed By Police?,
FIVETIIRTYEIGHT (July 21, 2016, 1:24 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
why-are-so-many-black-americans-klled-by-police/ [https: //perma.cc/4AMD-
HL7B]; Kimbriell Kelly et aL, Fatal Shootings by Police Remain Relatively Un-
changed After Two Years, WASH. Posr (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.washington
post. com/investigations/fatal-shootings-by-police-remain-relatively-unchanged-
after-two-years/2016/12/30/fc807596-c3ca- 1 le6-9578-0054287507db
story.html [https://perma.cc/DG3W-MG5M]; John Sullivan et al., Number of Fa-
1283
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tion and protest, the situation remains bleak: data suggests
that police are killing people at roughly the same rate as they
did before Michael Brown's shooting in Ferguson, Missouri
sparked national protests.6 As officers continue to be acquitted
of charges or not charged at all-even when questionable police
killings and other acts of aggression are documented on
video-communities are still finding little accountability in the
legal system.
7
tal Shootings by Police is Nearly Identical to Last Year, WASH. POST (July 1, 2017),
https: //www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/number-of-fatal-shootings-by-
police-is-nearly-identical-to-last-year/2017/07/01/98726cc6-5b5f- 11 e7-9fc6-
c7ef4bc58d 13_story.html?utm_term=.34888baef7c6 [https: //perma.cc/D76Q-
VN3X] ("Since Brown's killing in Ferguson, other fatal shootings by police, many
captured on video, have fueled protests and calls for reform. Some police chiefs
have taken steps in their departments to reduce the number of fatal encounters,
yet the overall numbers remain unchanged."); see also CENTER FOR POLICING EQ-
UITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 4 (2016),
https: //policingequity.org/images/pdfs-doc/CPE-SoJ_Race-Arrests-UoF_2016-
07-08-1130.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW8B-QLV6] ("Even though this is a con-
servative estimate of bias, the analyses of 12 law enforcement departments from
geographically and demographically diverse locations revealed that racial dispari-
ties in police use of force persist even when controlling for racial distribution of
local arrest rates."). See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL (2017)
(discussing police violence and the need for protocols governing lethal police
force). It must also be added that police violence has always been a problem for
communities of color. See, e.g., Nancy Krieger et al., Trends in US Deaths Due to
Legal Intervention Among Black and White Men, Age 15-34 Years, by County
Income Level: 1960-2010, 3 HARVARD PUB. HEALTH REv., Jan. 2015, at 2, http://
harvardpublichealthreview.org/190/ [https://perma.cc/8SY2-LCEE] ("[T]he ex-
cess black vs. white mortality rate among men age 15-34 due to legal intervention
is . . . longstanding. .. ").
6 Carl Bialik, The Police Are Killing People as Often as They Were Before
Ferguson, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 7, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://fvethirtyeight.com/
features/the-police-are-killing-people-as- often-as-they-were-before-ferguson/
[https://perma.cc/YWS2-4KTQ]; Police Shootings 2018 Database, WASH. POST
(2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/police-
shootings-2018/?utmterm=.ee2e914413ba [https: //perma.cc/7LES-BS4X]; Po-
lice Shootings 2017 Database, WASH. POST (2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2017/?
noredirect=ON [https://perma.cc/7NR7-37TG]; see also Rob Arthur et al., Shot
by Cops and Forgotten: Police Shoot Far More People Than Anyone Realized, A Vice
News Investigation Reveals, VICE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/
shot-by-cops [https:// perma.cc/PZ7Q-8JLL] ("An exclusive analysis of data from
the 50 largest local police departments in the United States shows that police
shoot Americans more than twice as often as previously known. Police shootings
aren't just undercounted-police in these departments shoot black people at a
higher rate and shoot unarmed people far more often than any data has shown.").
7 See, e.g., Faith Karimi et al., Tulsa Officer Acquitted in Fatal Shooting of
Terence Crutcher, CNN (May 18, 2017, 3:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/
17/us/tulsa-police- shooting-trial/index.html [https://perma.cc/38QS-RJC6]
(describing a case in which an officer was acquitted of shooting an unarmed man
despite video evidence showing the man "with his arms in the air before being
shot"); Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y.
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytlmes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shoot-
1284
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This draws attention to a tension that deserves further
theoretical, doctrinal, and empirical exploration: how is it that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on police use of force can be
thought of by the Court and many legal scholars as restricting
police and yet, as an empirical matter, communities (especially
those of color) are experiencing continued if not increasing in-
stances of police violence? Put differently, how can it be that
ostensibly protective if not progressive constitutional stan-
dards and judicial interpretations aimed at greater fairness,
transparency, and restraint are so profoundly ineffective?
A common response to these questions is that police vio-
lence is a product of individualized racism, i.e., the racism-
whether implicit or explicit-of individual officers8 that under-
mines the protective nature of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
According to this "bad apples" framing, the solution is simple:
more and better training aimed at reducing implicit bias and
removing officers who demonstrate explicit racism. In this
way, the institutions that support and enable these officers
remain without scrutiny-especially federal courts in their de-
cisions on whether certain uses of force violate the constitu-
tion. The racism of individual officers is, of course, important,
and improving officer training to maximize respect for commu-
nity members and minimize force in resolving conflict is essen-
tial to ethical and effective policing. But it is also important to
be attentive to the roles played by policy in these dynamics.
A fruitful place to begin this work is to understand how the
Fourth Amendment shapes local, official ground rules for
ing-trial-philando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/9D43-ZVTG] (describing a case
in which an officer was acquitted despite video of the victim's girlfriend "live-
streaming the aftermath of [the] police shooting of her boyfriend, Philando Castile,
and narrating the searing, bloody scene that was unfolding around her"); see also
AMNES'IY INTERNATIONAL, DEADLY FORCE: POLICE USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
alusadeadlyforcereportjune2015-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2JU-S4UT] ("What
is urgently needed is a nationwide review and reform of existing laws, policies,
training and practices on police use of lethal force, as well as a thorough review
and reform of oversight and accountability mechanisms. As this demonstrates,
one of the steps that needs to be taken is for state laws to be thoroughly reformed
or, in some cases, replaced with new laws to ensure that police are not permitted
to use lethal force except where it is necessary to protect against an imminent
threat of death or serious injury.").
8 See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly, Jeff Sessions Blames Bad Apples for Police Abuse.
He Should Read These DOJ Reports., HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2017, 10:50 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-jeff-sessions-civil-rights-police
us_58767eb3e4b092a6cae4ac97 [https://perma.cc/JT6U-H6G6] (describing
testimony by former Attorney General Jeff Sessions implying that individual of-




when, how, and in what manner police can use force against
civilians. Recent discussions concerning police violence have
focused on a number of potential reforms, from body cameras
to civilian review boards to implicit bias testing. Yet, surpris-
ingly, the basic rules and regulations that govern police en-
gagements have been largely neglected as a site for scholarly
attention. These administrative regulations concerning civil-
ian-police encounters-known as "use of force policies"-dic-
tate, delimit, and incentivize police behavior. They are written
policies of how police must act in scenarios where force against
citizens is used as part of their law enforcement duties.
Use-of-force policies serve at least two core overlapping
functions: (1) they are the guidelines and instructions police
departments use to train and direct officers on when, where,
and how much force to use; and (2) they are also often used to
decide whether an officer's conduct is punishable by the de-
partment after an incident. Thus, these policies are embedded
in both the production of the violent event as well as how that
event is read and legitimated in administrative and legal con-
texts after it happens. Taken together, use-of-force policies
perform the important function of both instructing officers in
force usage and providing a standard by which alleged devia-
tions may be measured. As a result, such policies are an im-
portant place for scholarly inquiry to understand how Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is translated into local rules and
the role these policies might play to produce lasting and mean-
ingful reform in a context of persistent police violence.9
Despite this critical role, there is currently little systematic
knowledge of the content in police use-of-force policies. To
further our understanding of these policies, this Article en-
gages in an empirical analysis of use-of-force policies from the
seventy-five largest cities10 in the United States." Scholars
across many disciplines have conducted empirical work on
use-of-force policies, largely focusing on aggregate incidents,
9 See Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES.
167, 173 (1969) ("Structural violence is silent, it does not show-it is essentially
static, it is the tranquil waters. In a static society, personal violence Will be
registered, whereas structural violence may be seen as about as natural as the air
around us." (emphasis omitted)).
10 Of the top seventy-five largest cities, the use-of-force policy from Memphis,
TN (the twenty-fifth) is not available. We therefore excluded Memphis from our
analysis and included the seventy-sixth largest city, Fort Wayne, Indiana.
11 Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places of
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individual case studies, or models for intervention in a manner
that is largely detached from Fourth Amendment considera-
tions. 12 The use-of-force study in this Article differs from other
scholarly work in that the unit of analysis is the policies them-
selves. By conducting a rich content analysis of these seventy-
five use-of-force policies, this study collects, codes, and evalu-
ates local police understandings of Fourth Amendment restric-
tions regarding excessive use of force.
Our study highlights three important findings. First, use
of force policies rely upon the vagueness and ambiguity of
Fourth Amendment case law. By this, we mean that virtually
every use-of-force policy contains the language of "reasonable-
ness" reiterated throughout court decisions since Graham v.
Connor in 1989 without much discussion of what this con-
struct means as an on-the-ground, tactical matter. Absent fur-
ther textual instruction on what "reasonable" means in
particular circumstances, the judicial interpretation of this
Fourth Amendment protection remains unarticulated, devolv-
ing into a legal gray area. Second, as a result of this ambiguity,
use-of-force policies largely refrain from affirmative policymak-
ing, which gives police officers wide latitude to use the force
they deem appropriate in any given situation. Rather than
restraining police behavior, this latitude can function as creat-
ing before the fact justifications for police force. Third, these
use-of-force policies do not include sufficient protections for
civilian health and safety.
These empirical findings not only provide useful insights
into the inner workings of use-of-force policies, they also sug-
gest a novel theoretical understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment's relation to these policies. The Fourth Amendment, as
with much of statutory and constitutional law, is thought of as
an exogenous mechanism that governs police engagements.
Because the Fourth Amendment is conceived as a repository of
rights for citizens against the police, surrounding debates
12 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert & John M. MacDonald, Police Use of Force: An
Analysis of Organizational Characteristics, 18 JUST. Q. 393, 393 (2001); Geoffrey
P. Alpert & Michael R. Smith, Police Use-of-Force Data: Where We Are and Where
We Should Be Going, 2 POLICE Q. 57, 57 (1999); Robert J. Friedrich, Police Use of
Force: Individuals, Situations, and Organizations, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 82, 82 (1980); Michael D. White, Controlling Police Decisions to Use
Deadly Force: Reexamining the Importance of Administrative Policy, 47 CRIME &
DELINQ. 131, 131 (2001); David Jacobs & Robert M. O'Brien, The Determinants of
Deadly Force: A Structural Analysis of Police Violence, 103 AM. J. SOC. 837, 837
(1998); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Difference in Police
Use of Force 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2018),
http: //www.nber.org/papers/w22399 [https: //perma.cc/QR5Q-2YCD].
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largely frame it as an external legal mechanism that provides
rules that constrain state power through judicial review. The
empirical analysis of use-of-force policies provided in this Arti-
cle, however, suggests that the judiciary's understanding of the
Fourth Amendment and constitutionality of police force may be
endogenous rather than exogenous. Instead of an independent
judiciary determining the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and impressing it upon local police departments, local depart-
ments create meaning and symbolic adherence to ambiguous
constitutional norms by developing use-of-force policies that
reflect their own institutional and administrative preferences.
In turn, federal courts defer to these policies as a reasonable
iteration of police force.
To make this argument, we extend Lauren Edelman's'
3
"legal endogeneity theory" to the Fourth Amendment and use-
of-force policy context. Edelman developed this sociological ac-
count to explain how the Civil Rights Act of 1964, despite its
progressive aspirations, did not produce its intended effects on
discrimination in hiring and other workplace dynamics. 14 Le-
gal endogeneity permits a more nuanced theorization of Fourth
Amendment excessive force jurisprudence. Fourth Amend-
ment scholars have discussed federal courts' tendency to defer
to police expertise. These largely historical and doctrinal ac-
counts examine how police officers' status as professionals has
been used to offer testimonial or experiential knowledge that
can assist the court.15 Yet, this scholarship has not empiri-
cally explored the sociological dynamics leading courts to not
simply defer to expert testimony or police practices, but to al-
low the policy preferences of police departments-as organiza-
13 LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC
CIVIL RIGHTS 12 (2016).
14 See generally id. at 3-20 (examining change in workplace inequality or the
basis of race and gender in the decades after the Civil Rights Act of 1969 became
law).
15 See, e.g., Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (2017) (exploring the history of courts seeking police
expert testimony in criminal matters); Aziz Huq, Fourth Amendment Gloss, 113
Nw. U. L. REV. 701, 703 (2019) (drawing upon the idea of 'historical gloss' in the
separation of powers context to highlight how longstanding, on-the-ground police
practices in search and seizure contexts informs judicial decision making). For
broader discussions of judicial deference in criminal procedure, see generally
Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialisr: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial
Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 783, 785 (2014) (exploring federal
courts' tendency to defer to pretrial evidence collected by investigators despite
questions of accuracy or accountability); L. Song Richardson, Police Effiency and
the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1195 (2012) (discussing problems that
arise when courts defer to the judgements of criminality provided by law
enforcement).
1288 [Vol. 104:1281
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tions-to shape federal courts' interpretation of what
constitutes excessive force as a constitutional matter. The def-
erence discussed in relation to legal endogeneity is quite differ-
ent from the "deference" discussed by some Fourth
Amendment analysts. The sociological literature is interested
in the dynamics leading organizational actors to interpret
polysemous rules meant to regulate them, develop internal ad-
ministrative policies-here, on use of force-that reflect their
interests and perspectives, and have these policies deferred to
by federal courts as the appropriate interpretation of constitu-
tional meaning. This is less a matter of federal courts soliciting
individual expert testimony from police officers or assessing
existing police practices and more an instance of federal courts
abdicating their interpretive role and allowing the administra-
tive policies of police departments to define the meaning of
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
Rather than conceptualizing excessive force as a deviation
from externally imposed (i.e., "top-down") constitutional rules
that shape departmental policies on use of force, legal en-
dogeneity theory characterizes the structural and doctrinal
pathways through which the administrative preferences of po-
lice departments can become constitutional aw in a "bottom-
up" fashion. This dynamic has been underappreciated, yet it
provides a novel explanation for how brutal examples of exces-
sive force by police persist largely without consequence at the
very moment that seemingly progressive laws and policies on
police restraint are on the books. Exposing the endogenous
nature of how police preferences concerning excessive force
can shape the Fourth Amendment (rather than the Fourth
Amendment driving police behavior) also offers new points of
intervention for developing meaningful reform. 16
This Article consists of five parts. Part I reviews the litera-
ture concerning Supreme Court decisions and existing scholar-
ship on police excessive force and use-of-force policies. This
section provides a brief overview of the Fourth Amendment
case law regulating force usage and reviews different scholarly
perspectives on this jurisprudence. In Part II, we present find-
ings from our content analysis of use-of-force policies from the
16 See Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Constitutional Interpretation
Without Judges: Police Violence, Excessive Force, and Remaking the Fourth Amend-
ment 105 VA. L. REV. 425, 927 (2019) (arguing that understanding the endoge-
nous relationship between the Fourth Amendment and use-of-force policies
creates opportunities for communities to participate in the development of local
use-of-force policies to shape federal courts' understanding of excessive force in a
manner that prioritizes civilian health and safety).
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seventy-five largest cities and demonstrate how these policies
rely on ambiguous case law. We introduce legal endogeneity
theory in Part III, originally developed in a statutory context by
Lauren Edelman, and explain how it can be adapted in a con-
stitutional space. We then engage in a doctrinal examination of
federal court decisions that connects our empirical findings to
legal endogeneity theory to describe the iterative processes
through which the ambiguous case law outlined in Part I inter-
acts with the use of force policies discussed in Part II to enable
a system of normalized excessive force by the police. The Arti-
cle concludes with a discussion of how legal endogeneity theory
can allow for reconceptualizing our understanding of the rela-
tionship between the Fourth Amendment, use-of-force policies,
and police behavior in a manner that might create new doctri-
nal opportunities for police reform and reduce the violence and
adverse health impacts suffered by communities where police
excessive force is common.
I
USE OF FORCE: DOCTRINE, CASE LAW, AND SCHOLARSHIP
The law regarding police use of force gives significant dis-
cretion to police officers and provides few mechanisms for over-
sight. 17 By channeling all claims regarding police use of
excessive force during arrests or investigatory stops through
Fourth Amendment analyses, the legal system individualizes
remedies for those subjected to police violence and disconnects
this issue from its structural causes.'8 In this context, police
departments have legal support to produce policies that con-
tain abstract statements regarding force usage without sub-
stantive protections for citizens-all while giving individual
officers wide latitude to use deadly and non-deadly force. 19 In
17 John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly
Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 155, 161 (2016) (Supreme Court
case law has resulted in "a highly deferential standard by which to determine
whether use of force is justified; the decision to use deadly force is left almost
entirely up to the individual officer").
18 Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment:
Understanding Police Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment
of Graham v. Connor, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1465, 1469 (2018) (discussing how the
Graham decision changed excessive force jurisprudence by forcing all claims into
a Fourth Amendment analysis).
19 See Gross, supra note 17, at 155-56 ("While the Supreme Court has made
it clear that the Fourth Amendment applies to questions about the use of deadly
force, the Court has never given any specific guidance to law enforcement on
when the use of deadly force is justified-and the standard of review the Court has
promulgated is highly deferential to the judgment of police officers.").
[Vol. 104:12811290
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this section, we briefly examine the case law giving rise to this
situation as well as how it has been discussed in legal
scholarship.
A. Case Law
While use of force policies are a central part of understand-
ing the causes of police violence, it is also important to appreci-
ate how these policies are supported by legal precedent that
creates the conditions for departments to develop these docu-
ments.20 There are a few key Supreme Court cases that ex-
amine the constitutional parameters of police use of force, with
Tennessee v. Garner21 and Graham v. Connor2 2 being the most
prominent. But these cases are notoriously thin in substance;
little direction is given to officers or to police departments on
what the law requires of them.23 Moreover, police violence in
general is not a subject that arises often for the Supreme
Court,2 4 and therefore there are only a handful of authoritative
decisions that speak to a social and legal issue that has gained
recent visibility. 2
5
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. Gar-
ner.26 Edward Garner, a 15-year-old African American boy,
was shot in the back of the head as he ran in the aftermath of
comnitting a burglary, even though the officer who shot him
20 See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justifed?, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1119, 1123 (2008).
21 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
22 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
23 See Tim Longo, Defining Instrunentalities of Deadly Force, 27 TOURO L. REV.
261, 267 (2011) ("The rule of law that comes out of Garner is limited to deadly
force, and only in the context of the fleeing felon. Graham. on the other hand,
pertains to all uses of force." (footnote omitted)); see also Brandon Garrett & Seth
Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 278-88 (2017)
(examining the empirical evidence of use-of-force policies adopted by various
agencies and how the language in Graham affected the formulation of those
policies).
24 william J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1043 (1995) ("[Clases like Garner are telling precisely because
they are so rare. For every reported decision discussing the law of deadly force,
dozens discuss the rules that govern automobile searches. And amazingly, there
is virtually no case law governing the use of nondeadly force." (footnote omitted));
Gross, supra note 17, at 157 (the Supreme Court "seldom addresses the issue of
police officer use of force; when the issue is addressed, legal justifications for the
use of force, and the limitations on when the use of force is appropriate are not
analyzed or discussed in any great detail").
25 Longo, supra note 23, at 262 ("[The Supreme Court of the United States
has decided only three cases to help determine the scope and extent of appropri-
ate force: Tennessee v. Garner, Graham v. Connor, and Scott v. Harris." (footnotes
omitted)).
26 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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saw that he did not have a gun in his hand.27 The Court
characterized the main issue of the case in fairly narrow terms
by deciding on "the constitutionality of the use of deadly force
to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected
felon."28 The Court concluded that deadly force cannot be used
unless it is "necessary" to prevent escape and the officer be-
lieves that the citizen "poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others."29 Garner's ac-
tions did not merit the officer using fatal force to stop him,
leading the Court to establish a clear rule that an officer cannot
use fatal force to stop unarmed fleeing suspects who pose no
threat.
While Garner created an affirmative limit on excessive
force, subsequent decisions failed to clarify this line of analy-
sis.30 In 1989, the Court decided Graham v. Connor.3 1 A police
officer stopped Dethorne Graham, an African American man
who was experiencing hypoglycemia, after he quickly (and, to
the officer's eyes, suspiciously) entered and left a convenience
store seeking orange juice to offset his diabetic condition.3 2
Additional police officers were called to the scene. They errone-
ously believed that Graham was intoxicated and arrested him.
In the ensuing interaction, Graham passed out, was tightly
handcuffed, and roughly thrown in a police car. He sustained
"a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an
injured shoulder."33 Graham brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to recover damages for injuries caused by the arresting
officers' excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.34 The Court characterized their decision as describing
"what constitutional standard governs a free citizen's claim
27 Id. at 3-4, 4 n.2.
28 Id. at 3; see also Chase Madar, Why It's Impossible to Indict a Cop, NATION
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-its-impossible-indict-
cop/ [https://perma.cc/5XKN-2KVZ] (arguing that the lack of police accountabil-
ity for lethal violence is tied to the Supreme Court's holding in Gamerj.
29 Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.
30 See Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable is the Reasona-
ble Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 483
(1994) ("Prior to 1989, most federal circuits followed the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process 'shocking to the conscience' standard enunciated by the
Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick. Under Johnson, the subjective mental state of
the offending officer was relevant as a factor to help determine if an actionable
injury had occurred." (footnote omitted)).
31 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
32 Id. at 388-89.
33 Id. at 390.
34 Id. at 389.
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that law enforcement officials used excessive force."3 5 The
Court decided that instead of a Fourteenth Amendment sub-
stantive due process standard, an "objective reasonableness"
approach under the Fourth Amendment applies to allegations
of excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop.
36 Cit-
ing Garner,37 the Graham Court clarified that this Fourth
Amendment analysis should focus on the particular facts and
circumstances of the case, including the severity of the crime,
the immediacy of the threat posed by the citizen, and whether
the citizen resisted arrest or tried to escape.3 8 Moreover, law
enforcement's actions are to be judged "from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight."
3 9
Graham entrenched the objective reasonableness tandard
into legal determinations of police excessive force.40 While Gar-
ner arguably had the potential to support plaintiffs by drawing
clear lines on what police can and cannot do, Graham cabined
this potential41 within the limitations of the Fourth Amend-
ment by emphasizing "reasonableness"-a standard that de-
fers to police interpretations at the scene.42 Instead of enabling
35 Id. at 388.
36 Id. Fourteenth Amendment claims continue to be available to plaintiffs
who are harmed by law enforcement through police interactions other than inten-
tionally applied force to seize or stop a suspect. See County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998).
37 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to Eric Garner and Beyond: The Importance
of Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of Force in Police Reform, 12 DuKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POLY 53, 80 (2016) ("In following Garner, Graham did not overrule
or subrogate the former case, or minimize Garner's prohibition on lethal force
against non-dangerous fleeing suspects. Graham set an 'objective reasonable-
ness' standard for evaluating excessive force claims against police generally.").
41 See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 23, at 216 (calling Garner "a high-
water mark of [the police violence] body of case law").
42 See Jonathan M. Smith, Closing the Gap Between What Is Lawful and
What Is Right in Police Use of Force Jurisprudence by Making Police Departments
More Democratic Institutions, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 315, 323 (2016) ("Terry [v.
Ohio], Garner, Graham, and other Supreme Court decisions regarding the Fourth
Amendment in the 1960s, '70s, and '80s placed substantial weight on balancing
police powers against the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
ests. . . . In the cases decided in more recent terms of the Court, very little
consideration is given to the interests of the individual. As a result, there have
been no significant cases in the last decade in which the Supreme Court has held
that the individual's rights trumped the governmental interest." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Gregory Howard Williams, Controlling the Use of Non-Deadly Force: Policy
and Practice, 10 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 79, 95 (1993) ("[Tlhe basic problem with
Graham is the fantasy of the Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' test and the so-
called balancing analysis. 'Reasonableness' is never truly defined, and unfortu-
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individuals harmed by the use of force to mobilize substantive
due process, Graham makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to
successfully bring suits against the police.43
The Court further strengthened the reasonableness tan-
dard in 2007 with its decision in Scott v. Harris44 "[aifter nearly
twenty years of silence on the issue."45 Scott dealt with a high-
speed chase where Harris's injuries were a result of Officer
Scott's use of the "Precision Intervention Technique" (PIT). PIT
involves an officer using his patrol car to push the rear bumper
of a suspect's vehicle.4 6 The Court rejected Harris's argument
that there was a clear "easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth
Amendment context"4 7 coming out of Garner. Instead, the
Court noted that the Fourth Amendment requires a court to
"still slosh [its] way through the fact-bound morass of'reasona-
bleness.'"4 8 The Court held that Scott's use of force did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonable
under the circumstances to believe Harris presented a serious
risk to others.
49
nately the balance rarely weighs in favor of the citizen. While the Supreme Court
makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment balancing analysis cannot be applied
with mechanical precision, the result almost always results in a balancing in favor
of the government, as decisions since Graham have shown." (footnotes omitted));
see also Obasogie & Newman, supra note 18, at 1497 (discussing how "futile" the
Fourth Amendment is for understanding the complexities and nuances of racial-
ized police violence, a structural violence); Zach Newman, Note, "Hands Up, Don't
Shoot": Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 145-48 (2015) (discussing the problems of using con-
stitutional rights to address police violence).
43 See Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), https://mobfle.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-
the-supreme-court-protects-bad-cops.html?_r=O [https: //perma.cc/6JTS-D2X2]
("[The court has made it very difficult, and often impossible, to hold police officers
and the governments that employ them accountable for civil rights violations.
This undermines the ability to deter illegal police behavior and leaves victims
without compensation. When the police kill or injure innocent people, the victims
rarely have recourse."); Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 23, at 217 ("Only the
most egregious uses of force can result in police liability, and even then, not
easily.").
44 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
45 Harmon, supra note 20, at 1119; see also Garrett & Stoughton, supra note
23, at 217 ('The turn away from Garner was cemented by the Court's 2007
decision in Scott v. Harris, which reinforced the approach in Graham by holding
that there are no clearly impermissible uses of deadly force .... Instead, officers
may use force, including deadly force, so long as it is objectively reasonable to do
so in the circumstances of each case." (footnote omitted)).
46 Scott, 550 U.S. at 374-75.
47 Id at 383.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 384, 386.
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B. Scholarship on Police Use of Force
With these cases, the Supreme Court established its mod-
em approach to police use of force, which made it much harder
for police to be held accountable.50 While there are important
articles and commentaries on federal courts' use-of-force juris-
prudence, much more scholarly work is needed. In this sec-
tion, we review key writings on police violence and the Fourth
Amendment as a way to assess the current literature.
Rachel Harmon argues that the "Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment doctrine regulating the use of force by police of-
ficers is deeply impoverished."5 1 To Harmon, Scott only further
exacerbated the problems in use-of-force jurisprudence so that
the "law [is now] more incomplete and indeterminate than
ever."52 Harmon argues that "the Supreme Court's few opin-
ions fail to answer basic questions of why, when, and how
much force officers can use, while at the same time permitting,
if not encouraging, the use of irrelevant and prejudicial consid-
erations in evaluating whether an officer acted reasonably."
53
This results in a situation where there is no "principled basis"
for deciding when the use of force is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and, as a result, leads to many instances of
unconstitutional use of force going "uncompensated and
undeterred."54
Brandon Garrett and Seth Stoughton write that people
would be wrong to assume that "the U.S. Constitution protects
citizens against completely unjustified uses of deadly force" or
that there are "clear constitutional rules."55 From their per-
spective, the doctrine is "notoriously opaque and fact depen-
dent, providing little meaningful guidance to police officers and
rarely resulting in compensation to persons injured by police
officers."5 6 In turn, they argue that police departments rely on
these standards in producing department policies, causing a
ripple effect from the Supreme Court down to individual police
officers.57 They contend that not only is Fourth Amendment
excessive force case law problematic from a force-prevention
standpoint, it is also tactically flawed, in terms of police being
50 See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 23, at 217.
51 Harmon, supra note 20, at 1119.
52 Id at 1120.
53 1I at 1123.
54 Id.
55 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 23, at 211.
56 Id. at 218.
57 I& at 217-18.
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effective in using force when it is appropriate. 58 Hence, Garrett
and Stoughton argue that this case law leads to both bad use-
of-force policies and a failure of courts and police departments
to use best practices.59
In When Police Kill, Franklin Zimring parallels Garrett and
Stoughton in noting that changing the protocols that govern
lethal force is essential to decreasing police violence.60 To
Zimring, "the purposeful redrafting of protocols for the circum-
stances and procedures that must be followed in deadly force
encounters" is where activist and scholarly attention should
focus.6 1 In this redrafting process, there are two essential ar-
eas to shift: (1) clear restrictions on when lethal force can be
used and (2) clear mandates for when a shooting should stop
once begun.62 For Zimring, the most impactful reform will in-
volve creating "less destructive rules of engagement."6 3
John Gross argues that the case law fails to provide much
guidance on what counts as reasonable and justified force.64
To Gross, "the Court has failed to provide law enforcement with
any meaningful guidance on when the use of deadly force is
appropriate."6 5 He argues that use-of-force analysis should be
revised in order to give "meaningful guidance," and require that
officers "see a gun before they decide to use deadly force."66
Contrary to popular perception, Gross argues that citizens are
killed by police officers at disproportionately higher rates than
officers are killed in the line of duty.6 7 This further supports
the argument that the Supreme Court has provided a set of
opinions that cause officers to rely upon deadly force in a man-
ner that is incongruent with documented risks to officers.
Nancy Marcus argues that the Constitution puts firm re-
strictions on use of force under Garner, and that this means
officers should abide by the rule not to use deadly force against
those who do not pose an imminent threat.68 She contends
that the necessary restrictions already exist and that they just
58 Id. ("[Tloday's Fourth Amendment case law is not only poorly suited for
police training, but actually counterproductive, confounding efforts to draft clear
use-of-force policies.").
59 See id. at 300.
60 See ZIMRING, supra note 5, at 220.
61 I& at 224.
62 See id. at 227.
63 See id. at 219.
64 See Gross, supra note 17 at 155-56.
65 Id. at 156.
66 Id. at 180-81.
67 See id. at 156.
68 See Marcus, supra note 40, at 57.
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need to be followed by police.69 From this vantage point, if
these constitutional restraints were followed, we would not
have-or would have fewer-unnecessary killings by police.
70
Consequently, she concludes that "future [use-of-force] reform
efforts must include-at a bare minimum-an emphasis of
Garner's prohibition of deadly police force against unarmed,
non-dangerous fleeing persons."
7 1
A common theme from this stream of scholarly writing on
the Fourth Amendment is the perception that it can, does, or
should operate as an external or exogenous check on police
behavior. From the Court's perspective, Garner and Graham
provide rules developed from outside of police departments
that positively or normatively limit how police engage with com-
munities when using force. Traditional scholarly perspectives
align with this sentiment. Even those critical of the Supreme
Court jurisprudence and police behavior implicitly argue that
the path to justice is paved by the Court strengthening or being
more explicit about the constitutional boundaries of these ex-
ternal checks in order to provide better and clearer guidance
for police officers. But, as we argue in this Article, new avenues
to reform may open up by rethinking our understanding of the
relationship between constitutional law, judicial decisions, and
police use of force.
It is crucial to note that there is an important literature on
police violence that pushes back against this traditional formu-
lation concerning the Fourth Amendment's ostensibly protec-
tive nature in police use-of-force contexts. Scholars arguing
against the mainstream perspective emphasize the role of race
and racism in how police excessive force plays out on the
ground as well as the jurisprudential indifference to using legal
mechanisms to constrain such behavior. Much of the writing
on race and the Fourth Amendment speaks to the issue of
racial profiling and police stops. For example, Tracey Maclin's
Race and the Fourth Amendment bemoans the Court's ruling in
Whren v. United States72 that pretextual seizures via traffic
69 Id. ("Had the officers involved in the series of killings detailed in this article
respected the constitutionally mandated restraints on the use of deadly police
force, some of the victims of those police killings might still be alive. Instead, the
circumstances of many of these killings indicate that at least some police are no
longer aware of, or heeding, the constitutional limitations upon their use of force
against civilians.").
70 See id
71 Id. at 105.
72 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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stops are outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.73 The
empirical significance of such stops in relation to the surveil-
lance of communities of color has also been demonstrated by
scholars such as Jeffrey Fagan74 and Tracey Meares,75 who
highlight the deeply racialized nature of use-of-force jurispru-
dence and related issues.
Other scholars have pushed back against traditional use-
of-force jurisprudence by making direct links between stop-
and-frisk practices and police excessive force. For example,
Devon Carbado argues that "blue-on-black violence" can be
understood as comprising of six features-from hyper-surveil-
lance of Black communities to the doctrine of qualified immu-
nity-that allow police excessive force to persist in these
communities.76 Carbado embraces this framing of "blue-on-
black violence" as both a "rhetorical device" and to resist indi-
vidualist framings of police violence so as to highlight its struc-
73 Maclin notes:
The Court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to
say about pretextual stops of black motorists is not surprising. The
reasonableness analysis of recent Fourth Amendment cases empha-
sizes objective standards. The Court disfavors criteria and stan-
dards that require judges to ascertain the motivations and
expectations of police officers and citizens enmeshed in confronta-
tions that rarely have neutral observers. Moreover, the Whren
Court's unwillingness to consider the impact that pretextual traffic
stops have on black and Hispanic motorists is consistent with the
modem Court's trend of ignoring evidence of racial impact as a
factor in the reasonableness analysis mandated by the Fourth
Amendment.
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333, 338 (1998)
(footnotes omitted).
74 See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveil-
lance, and Race in the New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 611-14 (2016)
(examining racial disparities in police surveillance through the Boston Police De-
partment and arguing that Black individuals are more likely than their White
counterparts to be surveilled and stopped by police). For other articles by Prof.
Fagan on this topic, see also Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition
Based High Crime Areas, 107 CALIF. L. REv. 395, 395 (2019); John MacDonald &
Jeffrey Fagan, Using Shifts in Deployment and Operations to Test for Racial Bias in
Police Stops (Jan. 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://
www.aeaweb.org/conference/2019/preliminary/paper/anGDTfz6 [https://
perma.cc/P5DQ-SJR2]; Jeffrey Fagan et al., No Runs, Few Hits, and Many Errors:
Street Stops, Bias, and Proactive Policing (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
75 See generally Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and
Frisk, 10 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. SCl. 335, 336 (2014) (discussing the history of the
legal doctrine of stop and frisk, the effectiveness of this doctrine on any purported
crime reduction, and the procedural justice issues related to stop and frisk).
76 Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of
the Causes, 104 GEO. L. J. 1479, 1483-84 (2016).
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tural nature.77 In From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill,
Carbado delineates possible causes of police violence by focus-
ing on doctrinal pathways-specifically, the stop-and-frisk ju-
risprudence stemming from Terry v. Ohio and how that
incentivizes police contact with Blacks that all too predictably
leads to abuse and violence.78 Carbado's article is important in
that it attempts to push beyond the debate concerning the
cause of police violence that often oscillates between structural
determinants and racial inequality on one hand and rogue po-
lice officers on the other to show how law creates the conditions
for excessive force. He describes this approach as "put[ting] the
law back on the table"79-an effort that continues in this Arti-
cle through an examination of use of force policies and the
Fourth Amendment.
Some authors extend this oppositional account of the
causes and consequences of police violence. Paul Butler's
Chokehold: Policing Black Men takes an intersectional ap-
proach to understand how excessive force is constitutive of the
social control that the police exert on Black people through the
criminal justice process. Butler notes that "the problem is the
criminal process itself. Cops routinely hurt and humiliate
black people because that is what they are paid to do. Virtually
every objective investigation of a U.S. law enforcement agency
finds that the police, as policy, treat African Americans with
contempt. "80
Dynamics such as these have led some authors to call into
question the mainstream narrative surrounding the Fourth
Amendment, with scholars like I. Bennett Capers declaring
that "[t]he story of the development of our criminal procedure
jurisprudence is largely a story about race."8 1
Perspectives that complicate the mainstream account of
the relationship between police violence and the Fourth
77 Id. at 1482; see also Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64
UCLA L. REv. 1182, 1215-16 (2017) (emphasizing the importance of studying
excessive and deadly force as part of a larger system, rather than as isolated
events, and asserting that police use force against Black men more than any other
demographic as well as that the state sanctions and legitimizes this force).
78 Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio's
Pathway to Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1510-12 (2017).
79 Id. at 1510.
80 PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 2 (2017).
81 1. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship,
and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1 (2011); see also Michael
J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modem Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48,
48 (2000) (discussing the link between modem criminal procedure and Black
defendants in the Jim Crow South).
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Amendment do so without explicitly rejecting the exogenous
predicate that frames both the jurisprudential and scholarly
narratives. Thus, this conversation could benefit from an ex-
tended examination of the reciprocal relationship between use
of force policies developed by police departments, the constitu-
tional rules thought to govern them, and the role of federal
courts in turning police perspectives on force usage into law.
To begin such an analysis, the next section explores a series of
key empirical questions: How do local police departments un-
derstand this constitutional discussion in terms of the limits
placed on their ability to use force on civilians? What policies
are in place to train and hold officers accountable? Outside of
a handful of reviews,8 2 there has not been a systematic social
scientific analysis of use-of-force policies used by local police
officers to understand the restrictions placed on law enforce-
ment in light of Fourth Amendment guarantees and the protec-
tions offered to civilians.
II
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF USE-OF-FORCE POLICIES
As previously noted, there has been little scholarly re-
search on use-of-force policies, and even less attention paid to
what rules and procedures are contained within them. Previ-
ous work has largely skimmed the surface of these policies
without looking closely at their text in a manner that allows for
an aggregate understanding of the rules that shape police of-
ficers' behavior when they use force on civilians. In this Part,
we discuss the results of a content analysis of use of force
policies from the seventy-five largest cities. This analysis
builds on an earlier iteration of this project, where we coded
and analyzed the policies for the twenty largest cities.8 3 That
project focused specifically on use-of-force policies' public
82 See, e.g., Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 23; Police Use of Force Project,
CAMPAIGN ZERO, http://useofforceproject.org/#project [https://perma.cc/YMN6-
4UKM] (last visited May 6, 2019); SAMUEL SINYANGWE, EXAMINING THE ROLE OF USE OF
FORCE POLICIES IN ENDING POLICE VIOLENCE 1 (2016), available at https://
static 1.squarespace.com/static/56996151 cbced68b 170389f4/t/57e 17531725e
25ec2e648650/1474393399581/Use+of+Force+Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4W76-4AMU]; CAMPAIGN ZERO, POLICE USE OF FORCE POLICY ANALYSIS 1 (2016), avail-
able at https: //static 1. squarespace.com/static/ 56996151cbced68b 170389f4/
t/57e lb5cc2994ca4ac 1d97700/1474409936835/Police+Use+of+Force+Report.
pdf [https: //perma.cc/JXA9-2JTX].
83 See generally Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Police Violence, Use
of Force Policies, and Public Health, 43 AM. J. L. & MED. 279, 280 (2017) (discuss-
ing how police use of force impacts public health and providing an empirical
assessment of use of force policies).
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health implications to the extent that ineffective protections for
citizens leads to poor health outcomes for communities. In this
Article, we provide an approach that is not only broader than
our previous effort but is also "deeper" than other examinations
of use-of-force policies. This combination of breadth and depth
allows for new and richer insights into use-of-force policies and
their relationship to Fourth Amendment concerns regarding
excessive force by the police.
A. Methods
The data used in our analysis came from the Campaign
Zero archive of use-of-force policies.84 We analyzed the policies
for the seventy-five largest available cities8 5 to develop both a
textured and holistic assessment of their content. We formu-
lated eighteen codes as part of an effort to capture the main
dimensions of use of force policies, from the most conventional
elements (e.g., whether the policy mentions reasonableness as
in Graham and other Supreme Court case law) to more cutting-
edge elements contained in forward-looking policies (e.g., em-
phasizing de-escalation and/or providing a robust use-of-force
84 The website for Campaign Zero hosts the use-of-force policies from several
cities in the United States. See DeRay Mckesson et al, Use of Force Policy
Database, CAMPAIGN ZERO, http://useofforceproject.org/database/ [https://
perma.cc/TY4B-3585 (last visited May 6, 2019). Our analysis is based on a
subset of this available data. Campaign Zero's analysis tried to identify which
use-of-force policies were useful in reducing excessive force by the police and then
determined how frequently they were present in existing departmental rules. The
empirical work performed in this Article differs in that it attempts to provide an
overview of use-of-force policies in general to provide a sense of the type of rules
and policies they contain-especially as these policies develop in conversation
with the Supreme Court's post-Graham jurisprudence on reasonableness.
85 1. New York City; 2. Los Angeles; 3. Chicago; 4. Houston; 5. Phoenix; 6.
Philadelphia; 7. San Antonio; 8. San Diego; 9. Dallas; 10. San Jose; 11. Austin;
12. Jacksonville; 13. San Francisco; 14. Columbus; 15. Indianapolis; 16. Fort
Worth; 17. Charlotte; 18. Seattle; 19. Denver; 20. El Paso; 21. Washington, D.C.;
22. Boston; 23. Detroit; 24. Nashville; 25. Memphis (not included because use-of-
force policy not available. Replaced by #76 Fort Wayne, IN); 26. Portland; 27.
Oklahoma City; 28. Las Vegas; 29. Louisville; 30. Baltimore; 31. Milwaukee; 32.
Albuquerque; 33. Tucson; 34. Fresno; 35. Sacramento; 36. Mesa, AZ; 37. Kansas
City; 38. Atlanta; 39. Long Beach; 40. Colorado Springs; 41. Raleigh; 42. Miami;
43. Virginia Beach; 44. Omaha; 45. Oakland; 46. Minneapolis; 47. Tulsa; 48.
Arlington, TX; 49. New Orleans; 50. Wichita; 51. Cleveland, 52. Tampa; 53. Ba-
kersfield, CA; 54. Aurora, CO; 55. Honolulu; 56. Anaheim, CA; 57. Santa Ana, CA;
58. Corpus Christi, TX; 59. Riverside, CA; 60. Lexington, KY; 61. St. Louis; 62.
Stockton, CA; 63. Pittsburg; 64. St. Paul, MN; 65. Cincinnati; 66. Anchorage; 67.
Henderson, NV; 68. Greensboro, NC; 69. Plano, TX; 70. Newark; 71. Lincoln, NE;
72. Toledo, OH; 73. Orlando; 74. Chula Vista, CA; 75. Irvine, CA. Annual Esti-
mates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places of 50,000 or More, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2016), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https: //perma.cc/RF83-Z8Y4].
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continuum8 6). The codes used in this study appear below
along with an operational definition of each concept:
8 7
1. Reasonableness: whether the policy mentions the "rea-
sonableness" standard.
2. Force levels: whether the policy describes different
levels of force.
3. Resistance levels: whether the policy describes different
levels of resistance.
4. De-escalation: whether the policy emphasizes de-
escalation.
5. Force continuum: whether the policy includes a contin-
uum or matrix describing the relationship between re-
sistance and force.
6. Reassessment whether the policy states that an officer
should continuously reassess the situation as it
evolves.
7. Proportionality: whether the policy states that force
should be proportional to resistance.
8. Exhaustion of alternatives: whether the policy states
that alternatives to deadly force (or to using force at all)
should be exhausted before escalating.
9. Verbal warning or advisement whether the policy men-
tions providing a warning, advising, or communicating
with citizens before force is used.
10. Human life: whether the policy includes a statement on
the value of human life.
11. Bias or prejudice: whether the policy includes a state-
ment on being bias-free.
12. Mental health: whether the policy discusses mental
health or substance abuse.
13. Prohibition on shooting at moving vehicles: whether the
policy precludes officers from shooting at or from mov-
ing vehicles unless necessary to prevent imminent
death or serious bodily injury.
14. Prohibition on shooting at 'fleeing felons": whether the
policy precludes officers from shooting at someone run-
ning away or escaping unless necessary to prevent im-
minent death or serious bodily injury.
86 See generally William Terrill et al., A Management Tool for Evaluating Police
Use of Force: An Application of the Force Factor, 6 POLICE Q. 150, 154 (2003)
("Police departments often present and use a continuum as a guideline that pro-
motes police escalation of force in 'small increments' in reference to the level of
resistance encountered. Thus, to achieve citizen compliance (with respect to a
force continuum), officers are encouraged to use a level of force that is commensu-
rate to the level of citizen resistance encountered.").
87 The authors coded the policies. Because the data is yes/no and not inter-
pretive (i.e., marking the presence or absence of each term/concept), no addi-
tional coders were used.
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15. Prohibition on dangerous chokeholds: whether the policy
precludes officers from using dangerous chokeholds
unless deadly force is authorized.
16. Reporting excessive force: whether the policy states that
officers must report other officers for using clearly ex-
cessive force.
17. Intervening against excessive force: whether the policy
states officers must intervene to stop other officers from
using clearly excessive force.
18. Medical aid: whether the policy states that officers
should summon medical assistance or provide first aid.
B. Findings
Each policy we examined contains a reference to the rea-
sonableness standard from Graham v. Connor. Nevertheless,
what is striking about the seventy-five use-of-force policies is
their internal variation. The distribution described in Figure 1
underscores this claim. Beyond these overall patterns, the pol-
icies also largely evince an absence of affirmative policymaking
that might limit officer behavior and lack focus on substantive
strategies or tactics that emphasize civilian health and safety.
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1. Reliance on Reasonableness Standard
One-hundred percent (100%) of the policies reviewed con-
tained some mention of reasonableness. This came in a few
different forms, from outright citing the standard from Graham
to vaguely referring to it in a broad sense. For example, the
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Denver use-of-force policy requires that "an officer shall use
only that degree of force necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances" and, further, that the "reasonableness of a par-
ticular use-of-force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.""" Milwaukee summarizes the case law in a
similar manner:
Objective reasonableness i judged from the perspective of a
reasonable police member facing similar circumstances and
is based on the totality of the facts known to the police mem-
ber at the time the force was applied, along with the mem-
ber's prior training and experience, without regard to the
underlying intent or motivation of the police member.89
Portland directly cites the case law: "Under Graham v. Connor
and subsequent cases, the federal courts have established that
government use of force must comply with the 'reasonableness'
requirement of the Fourth Amendment."90 Las Vegas similarly
cites to Graham in their definition of "force transitions" while
also describing escalation and de-escalation: "The movement,
escalation/de-escalation, from the application of one force type
to another in conjunction with the 'objectively reasonable' stan-
dard from [Graham v. Connor]."9 1
While it is unsurprising that use-of-force policies discuss
the guiding legal doctrine set by the Supreme Court, references
to "reasonableness" do not provide officers with pragmatic, de-
tailed, or sophisticated guidance in using force. Police
reproduce ambiguous judicial interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment in their local policies, which limits the develop-
ment of rules that might restrict force usage. This arrangement
provides greater leeway to police regarding the type and sever-
ity of force that can be used against civilians.
88 DENVER POLICE DEP'T, OPERATIONS MANUAL: USE OF FORCE POLICY 1 (2015),
https: / /static 1. squarespace.com/static/56996151 cbced68b 170389f4/t/569ad
5c20e4c1 148e6b 1089e/1452987846106/Denver+Use+of+Force+Polcy.pdf
[https: //perma.cc/GS2K-YUFD].
89 MILWAUKEE POLICE DEP'T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE: USE OF FORCE 2
(2015), https: //static 1.squarespace.com/static/56996151 cbced68b 1 70389f4/t/
569abf43c2 lb86e3d56a32fe/ 1452982086699/Milwaukee+Use+of+Force+Policy
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHZ9-DKQ6].
90 CITY OF PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU, 1010.00 Use of Force, https://www.port
landoregon.gov/police/article/647779 [https://perma.cc/LBX8-ZB87] (last vis-
Ited May 6, 2019).
91 LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP'T, USE OF FORCE POLICY 1150 (2015),
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In addition, it is also useful to look at the frequency of two
other related codes: force levels and resistance levels. Force
levels appeared in ninety-two percent (92%) of the policies sur-
veyed; resistance levels in seventy-nine percent (79%). We
coded for any discussion of force levels within a policy as well
as any mention of the levels of resistance an officer can face.
These are basic elements of a use-of-force policy in that they
describe officers ability to use multiple levels of force and that
there are different kinds of resistance that police may face.
A description of force levels could appear as it does in the
Cleveland policy, which states that "[dleadly [florce is any ac-
tion likely to cause death or serious physical injury" and "may
involve firearms, but also includes any force or instrument of
force . . . capable of causing death or serious injury."92 The
policy distinguishes this from "Less Lethal Force" which is "any
use of force other than that which is considered deadly force,"
and the policy includes pepper spray, Tasers, and batons as
examples.93 This is a straightforward description of deadly ver-
sus less lethal force, and is fairly commonsense. Yet, this ele-
mentary articulation does not provide much assistance to
officers.
In terms of resistance levels, a policy may or may not dis-
cuss the types of resistance a person may exhibit. For exam-
ple, the Denver Police Department's use-of-force policy
describes several dispositions, ranging from "Psychological In-
timidation-non-verbal cues in attitude, appearance, de-
meanor or posture that indicates [sic] an unwillingness to
cooperate or a threat"-to "Active Aggression," which is under-
stood as "[a] threat or overt act of an assault, coupled with the
present ability to carry out the threat or assault, which reason-
ably indicates that an assault or injury to any person is immi-
nent."94 Sometimes the discussion of citizen resistance is built
into the use-of-force continuum, which is what the Washing-
ton, D.C. use-of-force policy does. This policy describes the
force continuum as "a training model/philosophy that sup-
ports the progressive and reasonable scalation and de-escala-
tion of member-applied force in proportional response to the
92 CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE, GENERAL POLICE ORDER ON USE OF FORCE 2
(2002) (emphasis omitted), https://staticI.squarespace.com/static/56996151cb
ced68b 170389f456996151 cbced68b 170389f4/t/569ad416df40f3a31 fc7d5f2/
1452987425051/Cleveland+use+of+force+policy.pdf [https: //perma.cc/W6HG-
UxvPl.
93 Id. (emphasis omitted).
94 DENVER POLICE DEP'T, supra note 88, at 4.
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actions and level of resistance offered by a subject."95 In these
examples, we see policies that provide simple definitions of
increasing and decreasing levels of civilian compliance.
Our empirical findings show that policies (1) always cite to
the Graham reasonableness tandard to gesture toward over-
arching constitutional compliance and (2) very often include
generic references to a differentiation of force and resistance
levels. Providing definitions of force and resistance levels are
the most elementary "protections" a policy can offer. Yet, as we
will see in subsequent sections, restrictions beyond these foun-
dational elements are less likely to be found in these policies.
2. Basic Protections and Substantive Duties
Some policies do more than merely recite the reasonable-
ness standard and include a few restrictions, while others also
incorporate affirmative policies that limit the force used by po-
lice officers. Our analyses captured this dynamic with two dif-
ferent sets of codes: (1) policies containing basic protections
(i.e., general statements against shooting at vehicles, danger-
ous chokeholds unless deadly force is authorized, and shooting
at "fleeing felons" while requiring warnings before using force)
and (2) policies containing substantive and affirmative duties
(i.e., specific rules and regulations like de-escalation, propor-
tionality, reassessment, exhaustion of alternatives, and force
continua). Taken together with section 1, we can understand
use-of-force policies as having three tiers: a foundational level
(rearticulating reasonableness) that is found in all policies, a
middle level (the basic protections) that is less common, and a
higher level (substantive protections for citizens and obliga-
tions placed upon officers) that is relatively uncommon.
Regarding the middle-level basic protections, the require-
ment that officers refrain from shooting at vehicles appeared in
eighty percent (80%) of policies, and statements against shoot-
ing at "fleeing felons" appeared in eighty-one percent (81%).
Rules against dangerous chokeholds appeared in thirty-seven
percent (37%), which is low compared to the other three basic
protections often put in policies yet is still higher than many of
the more substantive discussions of force usage. The require-
ment that officers provide a warning appeared in eighty-three
95 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE, USE OF FORCE 3 (2002) (empha-
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(83%) percent of the policies. Hence, three out of four of these
basic protections are fairly common. Yet, these middle-tier
rules that serve as basic "dos and don'ts" of policing are not as
significant in restricting officer behavior as the substantive or
affirmative policymaking that we see with other third-tier poli-
cies like de-escalation or force continua.
An example of prohibitions on shooting at fleeing vehicles
can be found in the Tucson, Arizona use of force policy, which
states: "Officers shall not discharge a weapon ... [alt a moving
vehicle unless deadly force is being used against the officer or a
third party."9 6 Similarly, the Virginia Beach policy against
chokeholds notes that "[clhokeholds or neck restraints are not
authorized unless the use of deadly force is appropriate."
9 7
Regarding "fleeing felon" rules, the Minneapolis policy states
that deadly force is permitted to arrest, capture, or prevent the
escape of someone who the officer "knows or has reasonable
grounds to believe has committed or attempted to commit a
felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly force" or
"knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or
attempted to commit a felony if the officer reasonably believes
that the person will cause death or great bodily harm if the
person's apprehension is delayed."98 In terms of verbal warn-
ing or advisements, the Oakland, California, policy states: "To
the extent possible and without ever compromising safety,
members are required to use verbal commands to accomplish
the police objective before resorting to physical force."99 While
96 TUCSON POLICE DEP'T, GENERAL OPERATING PROCEDURES: USE OF FORCE 6
(2016), https: //web.archive.org/web/20170223215245/https: //www.tucsonaz.
gov/files/police/general-orders/2000USE OFFORCE.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SP2D-Y2R9].
97 VIRGINIA BEACH POLICE DEP'T, GENERAL ORDER: USE OF FORCE 2 (2014), https:/
/static 1. squarespace.com/static/ 5699615 1cbced68b 170389f4/t/ 569bf3aa40
667a727ee7ee5b/ 1453061040288/virginia+beach+use+of+force+policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9DE-9HKA]. Another example is from the Miami Police De-
partment use-of-force policy, where that policy specifically describes different
types of chokeholds the police are precluded from using: "Officers are prohibited
from utilizing the Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint (LVNR), chokehold, neck hold,
and/or any other restraint that restricts free movement of the neck or head."
MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP'T, DEPARTMENTAL ORDER 6, CHAPTER 21: USE OF FORCE 4,
https://static 1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b 170389f4/t/5758
4d061bbee036509d7 lea/ 1465404695957/Miami+UOF.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3H66-3MCL].
98 MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP'T, 5-300 Use of Force, POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL,
http: //www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/policy/mpdpolicy-5-300_5-300
[https://perma.cc/NX2A-AN82] (last visited May 6, 2019).
99 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF POLICE, OAKLAND POLICE DEP'T, MEMORANDUM ON REVISED




these examples highlight the fundamental importance of these
protections, they also draw attention to the lack of guidance
provided to officers regarding their general use of force. In the
most basic sense, these middle-tier policies merely tell officers
to refrain from certain unacceptable tactics and to provide a
warning.
Some policies contain more substantive protections that do
inform officers of what affirmative steps to employ. However,
this third tier of substantive rules is less common than most of
the second-tier basic protections. We coded substantive rules
as de-escalation (appearing in 52% of the policies coded), force
continua (48%), exhaustion of alternatives (31%), reassess-
ment (19%), and proportionality (17%). These are the specific
policies that departments can articulate that go above the bare
constitutional minimum of reasonableness and basic protec-
tions ("dos and don'ts") to proactively limit excessive force by
police.
New Orleans' use-of-force policy offers an example of de-
escalation: "Force shall be de-escalated immediately as resis-
tance decreases."10 0 This policy contains the specific require-
ment that officers adjust their force in relation to resistance.
Similarly, the Minneapolis policy states that "officers shall use
de-escalation tactics to gain voluntary compliance and seek to
avoid or minimize use of physical force."' 0' In this description,
we also see the motivation behind de-escalation: avoiding or
minimizing unnecessary use of force that might harm others.
Finally, the Sacramento, California policy describes specific de-
escalation techniques: "De-escalation techniques include, but
are not limited to, gathering information about the incident;
assessing risks; gathering resources (personnel and equip-
ment); using time, distance, cover; using crisis intervention
techniques; and communicating and coordinating a re-
sponse."'1 2 In so doing, this policy gives officers guidance on
not only what de-escalation means, but how to practice it.
Fewer than half of the policies surveyed contain force con-
tinua (48%) that can guide police use of force so that it is
100 NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP'T, PROCEDURE MANUAL 29 (2013), https://
static 1. squarespace. com/static/56996151cbced68b 170389f4/t/569adafed82
d5eOd876a81b2/1452989185205/NOLA+use+of+force+policy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZWY3-TJ73].
101 MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP'T, supra note 98.
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proportional to the situation. As an example of what these
policies can look like, the Charlotte, North Carolina policy con-
tains both a visual aid depicting the continuum of force relative
to levels of resistance as well as a description of what those
guidelines signify. 10 3 The policy further describes the levels of
resistance as going from "Non-Verbal and Verbal Non-Compli-
ance" to "Aggravated Active Aggression" and the levels of con-
trol as going from "Professional Presence" to "Lethal Force."'
0 4
Hence, while the continuum contains other elements, it specifi-
cally notes the relationship between force and resistance and
spells out the levels rather than simply saying officers should
act reasonably. In providing both a visual aid and a discus-
sion, this policy offers guidance in how to use force and how to
escalate and de-escalate accordingly based on response. '
0 5
With regard to policies requiring that an officer exhaust
alternatives (31%), the Nashville, Tennessee, use-of-force pol-
icy states that police "are permitted to use only that force which
is reasonable and necessary under the particular circum-
stances to protect themselves or others from bodily injury, and
only after other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or
it is determined that such alternative action(s) would be inef-
fective under the circumstances."1 0 6 This policy has the re-
quirement that officers act reasonably. But then it goes above
this to mandate that "reasonable alternatives" should be ex-
hausted. This approach draws attention to the idea that force
should be the last option, not the first.
Reassessment (19%) is a rare element of use of force poli-
cies. It is required by the San Francisco Police Department, as
their policy states: "Using a critical decision-making model,
officers shall collect information, assess the threats and risk,
consider police powers and the Department's policies, identify
options and determine the best course of action, and review
and re-assess the situation." ' 0 7 Similarly, the Sacramento Po-
lice Department's policy requires officers to "continuously reas-





106 NASHVILLE POLICE DEP'T, DEPARTMENT MANUAL 700 (2018), https://
www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/Police/dos/Strategic%2Develop
ment/MNPDManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR7H-Q2RG].






sess the perceived threat to select the reasonable use of force
response."10 8 As such, the concept of reassessment prompts
officers to continuously evaluate threat levels and make sure
their assessment aligns with the constantly changing
situation.
Finally, proportionality appears in less than one-fifth of the
policies. This concept is illustrated by the San Antonio, Texas,
policy which states that officers may use force "on an ascend-
ing scale of the officer's presence, verbal communications,
open/empty hands control, physical force, intermediate
weapon and deadly force, according to and proportional with
the circumstances of the situation."'0 9 Proportionality, while a
simple concept, ensures that officers use force that is commen-
surate with the resistance they are facing.
This content analysis demonstrates that substantive, af-
firmative policy choices are relatively rare in use-of-force poli-
cies, especially when compared to the blanket statements on
reasonableness and basic protections. Most policies foster
symbolic compliance with Graham's statement on reasonable-
ness instead of providing specific rules and processes for of-
ficers to engage when deciding whether to use force. Since
affirmative policies are not common, we are largely left with
use-of-force policies that reiterate what police think the law is
in order to comply without limiting force usage on the ground
or increasing the possibility of accountability when force be-
comes excessive.
3. Minimal Focus on Civilian Health and Safety
While the previous section of our findings discussed the
policies that can affirmatively structure an encounter, the poli-
cies discussed in this final section are more philosophical, pro-
vide special protections for vulnerable groups (e.g., people
suffering mental health crises), or speak to police response
after force is used (e.g., providing immediate medical atten-
tion). Our findings suggest that use-of-force policies that are
thought to protect the public may actually expand police lati-
tude and indicate minimal attention to civilian health and
safety. The set of codes used to capture this dynamic include:
statements on the sanctity of human life (68%); statements
108 SACRAMENTO POLICE DEP'T, supra note 102.
109 SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEP'T, GENERAL MANUAL: PROCEDURE 501-USE OF FORCE
1 (2014) (emphasis added), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151
cbced68b 170389f4/t/ 569be875dc5cb4298582fc94/ 1453058170849/San+Anto
nio+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf [https: //perma.cc/23Q3-S3FL].
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against bias or prejudice (12%); discussion of how mental
health intersects with use of force (perhaps offering strategies
for de-escalating in that particular context) (51%); and report-
ing and/or intervening against another officer when he or she
uses excessive force (reporting: 27%, intervening: 33%). The
only requirement in this category that is fairly common in the
data is the requirement that officers summon or perform imme-
diate medical aid after force is used (83%).
These additional protections signal different values ex-
pressed by the departments. Statements that the department
respects human life or is opposed to bias and prejudice signals
a philosophical alignment with those ideals. For instance, the
Washington, D.C. use-of-force policy states: "The policy of the
Metropolitan Police Department is to value and preserve
human life when using lawful authority to use force" and there-
fore "officers . . . shall use the minimum amount of force that
the objectively reasonable officer would use."1 10 Similarly thin
language is used in reference to bias and prejudice. For exam-
ple, Bakersfield, California combines this language with the
discussion of human life: "The Department recognizes and re-
spects the value of all human life and dignity without prejudice
to anyone."1 1 1
The intersection of mental health with police violence is a
critical issue. These codes capture elements of policies where
the department articulates standards regarding mental health
assessments of community members as part of a use-of-force
scenario. For example, the New Orleans policy states that, in
evaluating whether to use force and which level of force is rea-
sonable, one factor is the person's "mental state or capacity" as
well as the "effects of drugs or alcohol.'"" 2 Roughly half (51%)
of the policies discuss this issue. These rules target a specific
group for additional protections, or at least recognizes that
certain groups are more vulnerable to police use of force. Ac-
knowledging this in a policy-and going above and beyond a
bland recitation of reasonableness or basic protections-is
important.
110 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE, supra note 95.
111 BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEP'T, BAKERSFIELD PD POLICY MANUAL: USE OF FORCE 60
(2017), https: //www.muckrock.com/foi/bakersfield-3105/use-of-force-policy-
bakersfield-police-department-53955/#file- 190121 [https: //perma.cc/GC5A-
XYHC]. The New Orleans use-of-force policy puts it identically: "The Department
recognizes and respects the value of all human life and dignity without prejudice
to anyone." NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP'T, supra note 100, at 93.
112 NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP'T, supra note 100, at 94.
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Third, requiring a report or intervention when observing
excessive force is a mandate that instructs officers to be atten-
tive to what their colleagues are doing, meaning that they
should not inhibit investigations or protect each other when
violations occur. This requirement is not prominent in the data
(reporting: 27%, intervening: 33%). As an example, the Las
Vegas Police Department requires both intervening and report-
ing, articulating it as a "Duty to Intervene": "Any [commis-
sioned] officer present and observing another officer using force
that is clearly beyond that which is objectively reasonable
under the circumstances shall, when in a position to do so,
safely intercede to prevent the use of such excessive force. Of-
ficers shall promptly report these observations to a supervi-
sor.' 1 13 The requirement that officers report and/or intervene
against other officers using excessive force is important be-
cause it demonstrates that the department encourages officers
supervising one another to support civilian health and safety
rather than allowing officers to shield each other from liability.
Finally, ensuring those subjected to force receive immedi-
ate medical attention seems like it should be in every policy, as
it is a fairly basic idea that, post-force, a person should be
treated for their injuries in order to increase their chances to
survive. For instance, the New Orleans Police Department use-
of-force policy mandates: "Medical assistance shall be obtained
for any person who exhibits signs of physical distress, who has
sustained visible injury, expresses a complaint of injury or con-
tinuing pain, or who was rendered unconscious."114 While the
need for this might seem obvious, nearly one in five policies do
not contain this type of provision.
These data demonstrate that policies often fail to include
substantive protections that go beyond the constitutional floor
and basic norms of policing while largely reproducing the am-
biguous Fourth Amendment reasonableness tandard without
meaningful guidance on what type of force is in or out of
bounds. This speaks directly to Fourth Amendment questions
concerning excessive force. The data undermines claims that
the Fourth Amendment provides external guidance for how po-
lice officers should conduct their affairs. Moreover, this empiri-
cal investigation shows that the very use-of-force policies that
are thought to be responsive to exogenous Constitutional stan-
dards are often as vague as the standards themselves, giving
police officers wide discretion.
113 LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP'T, supra note 91, at 1156.
114 NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP'T, supra note 100, at 96.
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These findings also give rise to questions about how to
theoretically describe the character of local use-of-force poli-
cies in relation to constitutional mandates. Drawing upon
Lauren Edelman's legal endogeneity theory, the next Part dis-
cusses how the policy preferences of law enforcement as ex-
pressed through use-of-force policies allows regulated actors-
the police-to define what counts as excessive force, which is
often deferred to by federal courts to become the meaning of
law itself. Putting the empirical findings from Part II in conver-
sation with legal endogeneity theory allows for a deeper under-
standing of excessive force that goes beyond traditional
frameworks that view federal courts as exogenously producing
legal meanings that police comply with.
III
TOWARD AN ENDOGENOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND USE-OF-FORCE POLICIES
Law is traditionally thought of as being exogenous to soci-
ety. Constitutions and statutes are written. Cases are decided.
And, in a top-down fashion, the rules are thought to dictate
and determine how the state interacts with citizens or how
citizens interact with one another. Figure 2 visually represents
the exogenous perspective on use-of-force policies and Fourth
Amendment excessive force inquiries.
1313
_RN 4 I W REVIEW
r)[' e i a n llia r <~
[ ,r
1a jf e1~ I t
o R hs Proessor Imurpene p ts n bt
that s phhe cals lg l enoW enei 1 hov o{
Icn hih l bce constructe thog
13 at
20191 THE ENDOGENOUS FOURTH AMENDMENT 1315
The process of legal endogeneity can be described in three
parts.1 17 The theory (1) "posits that organizations respond to
ambiguous law by creating a variety of policies and programs
designed to symbolize attention to law"; (2) organizations
"equate the mere presence of these structures with legal com-
pliance"; and (3) legal and organizational actors fail to "scruti-
nize their effectiveness" once the structures are in place."18
Hence, there is the ambiguous law itself; the organization abid-
ing by it and enacting symbolic policies to perform compliance;
and then legal actors-from attorneys to judges-defer to the
symbolic measures created by organizations and treat them as
if they are in material compliance with an external law that was
never clearly defined.' 19
In practical terms, legal endogeneity operates as a recur-
sive process through which the status quo can be maintained,
and the regulated group gives life to the practices that become
the legal standards that ultimately regulates it. 120 By combin-
ing critical theory, 121 legal analysis, and empirical research, 122
117 See id. at 27 (2016) (Edelman separates legal endogeneity into six stages,
but we have consolidated it into three broad parts. The six stages that Edelman
uses are: "(1) ambiguous law, (2) professional framing of the legal environment, (3)
diffusion of symbolic structures, (4) managerialization of law, (5) mobilization of
symbolic structures, and (6) legal deference to symbolic compliance.").
118 Id. at 12.
119 See ic.
120 Id. at 12, 15 ("when organizations hold the key to the meaning of law, they
also harness its power, weakening the potential of social reform laws to achieve
ideals.").
121 Legal endogeneity theory offers an approach aimed at demystifying the
alleged post-racial, colorblind, and post-civil rights moment we exist in by under-
mining these dominant narratives to reveal how discrimination and oppression
continue to function. See id. at 5-11 (discussing the persistence of race and
gender inequalities after fifty years of civil legislation). This enables us to under-
stand the behind-the-scenes process that starts with the role of the Court and
often ends with the unnecessary death and injury to citizens. While these sys-
tems can be obfuscated, legal endogeneity theory helps us reveal their inner
workings in terms of how administrative policies on police use of force can shape
the meaning of constitutional law. See id. at 12 ("Legal endogeneity theory sug-
gests that the meaning of law evolves through the articulation and resolution of
problems not in the halls of Congress but rather in the halls of work organiza-
tions."). This is, by definition, an endeavor in critical theory, i.e., uncovering the
unsaid, normative, and hegemonic myths that sustain status quo relationships
and hierarchies. Critical theoretical approaches allow for the uncovering of these
iterative dimensions of law to reveal how systems continue to produce oppression
and disparate impacts.
122 Edelman relies on empirical data to make her arguments regarding em-
ployment law and civil rights. Mobilizing empirical data allows her to demonstrate
the objective consequences of sociolegal policy choices-both those of the courts
and those of organizations. Our goal is to similarly engage with both critical
theory and an empirical methodology, blending legal analyses with social science
tools. See generally, OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH
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legal endogeneity uncovers sociolegal processes that can over-
state the impact of formal civil rights legislation. It reveals how
organizational actors who are thought to be regulated through
these social reform laws remain in a position of power and
dominance. This, in turn, is how civil rights remain symbolic,
and how inequality persists despite overt legal proscriptions.
Edelman develops legal endogeneity theory to critically en-
gage with the persistence of inequality despite decades of legis-
lative and statutory protections designed to prevent
employment discrimination. 123 She focuses her critique on Ti-
tle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 124 and the laws that have
come after its enactment that mandate equal employment op-
portunity. 125 She applies this theory to what she calls "work
organizations" in order to explain the "limited success" that
civil rights laws in the employment law context have had on
materially changing employment equity. 126 Legal endogeneity
theory describes the "interplay between work organizations
and their legal environments."
127
While Edelman's work focuses on employment law and
statutory law, we contend that this framework can be adapted
to the constitutional law context. Traditionally perceived as the
apex of exogenous law, the U.S. Constitution can be extremely
vague, ambiguous, and broad. It requires interpretation and
implementation. Legal endogeneity theory has important im-
plications in the domain of constitutional law because it con-
tends that, at the very least, that organizations regulated by
seemingly detached textual mandates from the US Constitu-
tion can ultimately shape their meaning.
Legal endogeneity theory has particular relevance for
thinking through the Fourth Amendment in relation to the Su-
preme Court's excessive force jurisprudence, police violence,
and racially disparate use of force.128 Instead of taking an
THE EYES OF THE BLIND 1 (2014) (discussing the methodological benefits of blending
critical theory with social science methods). In this Article, we engage in a quali-
tative content analysis, with the intent of uncovering the elements of these use-of-
force policies, and then analytically engage this data with legal endogeneity the-
ory. We employ this methodology by both thinking through the endogenous quali-
ties of excessive force jurisprudence and also by using empirical methods to
understand overarching frameworks.
123 See EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 3.
124 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018).
125 See EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 5.
126 Id. at 12.
127 Id
128 See id. at 235 (Edelman discusses the fact that the theory "has implica-
tions for a number of literatures in the social sciences and law").
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exogenous approach in which we might solely critique federal
courts and specific doctrinal choices, we intend to understand
the reciprocal relationship between ambiguous Constitutional
text and judicial interpretations as well as the mechanisms
through which police departments' policy preferences regard-
ing the meaning of excessive force can become understood as
law.
FIGURE 3: LEGAL ENDOGENEITY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND
USE-OF-FORCE POLICIES
In applying Edelman's theory to the Fourth Amendment,
we argue that the Constitution is not immune from sociolegal
processes that can shape how law materializes. Even with the
federal court system and the interpretation and application of
Constitutional principles, organizations-in this instance, the
police departments that create use-of-force policies-can play a
role in bringing the law into real life and, in turn, lead courts to
incorporate policy preferences as valid iterations of
constitutionality.
Our empirical findings in Part III suggests that the broad,
ambiguous mandates of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted
by the Court-ostensibly designed to protect civilians from ille-
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gitimate uses of force by police-leaves police departments with
significant discretion to decide what the Fourth Amendment
means and, within this, what "objectively reasonable" force
looks like. These findings show that use-of-force policies rely
upon ambiguous language in Supreme Court case law and
largely fail to include meaningful descriptions of what specific
actions, behaviors, and duties constitute being reasonable. As
these data suggest, use-of-force policies often regurgitate the
vague mandates of Graham29 without providing much more,
reflecting the Court's failure to provide meaningful exogenous
guidance. Moreover, the resulting discretion for police depart-
ments to self-regulate and decide what reasonable means on
the ground can serve as endogenous determinants that federal
courts often point to in characterizing what the Fourth Amend-
ment requires. In the following section, we draw upon our
empirical data and examples from federal court cases regarding
police excessive force to highlight how legal endogeneity can
manifest itself in this Constitutional space.
A. Ambiguity and the Fourth Amendment
The three-step process of legal endogeneity theory begins
with the notion that the rules that legislative bodies and courts
produce to regulate organizations can be "broad and ambigu-
ous."'3 0 This ambiguity gives organizations the space to figure
out what compliance looks like in the social and legal environ-
ment that they occupy. '31 From this perspective, the meaning
of compliance is not determined when the law is made-in an
exogenous way-but once the law gets into the hands of those
regulated by it. 1
3 2
As noted in Part I, the Fourth Amendment itself is ambigu-
ous, merely affording "the people" the right to "be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects," which means being
free from "unreasonable searches and seizures,"133 whereby
excessive force has come to be included in the latter. But when
do such engagements become unreasonable? The Fourth
Amendment and judicial decisions concerning excessive force
leaves the meaning of this key doctrinal term largely undefined.
The Amendment does not specify what unreasonable actually
means, nor has the Supreme Court elaborated. In addition, the
129 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
130 EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 29.
131 See icL
132 See id.
133 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
[Vol. 104:12811318
20191 THE ENDOGENOUS FOURTH AMENDMENT
notion that the Fourth Amendment is thought of as the only
constitutional vehicle to address excessive force is in itself the
product of doctrinal choice. With Graham, the Supreme Court
firmly held that excessive force stemming from an arrest or
investigatory stop is to be understood as a Fourth Amendment
problem. 134 In doing so, the Court signaled that the only way
to think about police excessive force-violence that is often
racialized in a manner thought to give rise to Fourteenth
Amendment considerations-is through an ambiguous Fourth
Amendment.
Second, Graham as case law exacerbates the textual ambi-
guity of the Fourth Amendment by adding another level of im-
precision. As discussed in Part I, excessive force case law is
"notoriously opaque." 13 5 The Supreme Court rarely illuminates
its difficulties, leaving police with little to follow in developing
their internal policies that purport to adhere to the law.136
Because Graham held that incidents of force must be analyzed
using a "reasonableness" inquiry, 137 Graham doubles down by
adding another layer of jurisprudential haze. What we see in
this language is an avoidance of making substantive recom-
mendations to police departments, which keeps the doctrine
obscure.
These imprecisions are unable to provide clear guidance to
police officers and can serve as cover for even the most egre-
gious uses of force. Ambiguity creates the conditions for the
cascade of symbolism and inaction that ultimately becomes
endogenously created law. This lack of clarity permits the sec-
ond step of legal endogeneity theory to occur, where ambiguous
law is translated into symbolic policy.
B. Use-of-Force Policies as Symbolic Structures
In the second step of legal endogeneity, ambiguous laws
lead organizational actors to gesture toward compliance by de-
veloping symbolic policies that still maintain "managerial pre-
134 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394; Obasogie & Newman, supra note 18, at
1477-78.
135 See supra text accompanying note 56.
136 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 23, at 218.
137 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. This Inquiry involves looking at the relationship
between the intrusion to the individual versus the governmental interests, paying
"careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, includ-
ing the severity of the crime at issue," "whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat," and "whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest." Id. at 396.
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rogatives" and practices. 138 Organizations adapt to changing
legal terrain, but effectively preserve their interests. 139 They do
so by assuming "a variety of compliance positions that loosely
mimic public law enforcement."140  Edelman calls this
"managerialization": the process by which ambiguous legal re-
quirements are translated from substantive legal ideals into
practical, potentially symbolic internal policy choices that sig-
nal compliance internally and to outside legal actors while also
conforming to managerial prerogatives. 141 These policies
evince attention to the law while remaining primarily symbolic
in terms of material results. 142
The ambiguities across constitutional text and judicial rul-
ings allow police departments to develop and mobilize symbolic
structures-namely, use-of-force policies-that allow officers
to respond to claims of excessive force by pointing to docu-
mented standards concerning what is considered reasonable
and compliant behavior. 143 These use-of-force policies are crit-
ical; ambiguous Fourth Amendment standards become real-
ized in a form that is highly favorable to police through the
symbolic gestures of self-regulation.144 This is where substan-
tive legal ideals are manipulated and law is reconceptualized to
benefit the regulated group. Thus, law becomes endogenously
created-that is, given substance through managerial prefer-
ences expressed as administrative policies that federal courts
ultimately cede to. 145 As these forms of organizational compli-
ance gain legitimacy, symbolic compliance becomes normalized
as what compliance ought to look like in the real world.
As Edelman describes in the statutory context, the symbol-
ism of these policies exists along a spectrum.146 Symbolic
structures can range from being "merely symbolic," "both sym-
bolic and substantive, or may fall somewhere in between
merely symbolic and substantive."'4 7 Using this framework,
our findings show that some use-of-force policies are merely
symbolic, containing a reference to reasonableness and not
138 EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 31.
139 See id.
140 Id. at 24-25.
141 See EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 25.
142 See id.
143 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ("The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.").
144 EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 25.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 32.
147 Id.
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much else. For example, the Stockton, California Police De-
partment policy describes reasonableness and force levels, ver-
bal warnings, and medical aid. 148 Thus, the Stockton policy
fails to contain any descriptive or incentivizing language that
affirmatively tells officers to do anything other than to act rea-
sonably during an encounter, apart from giving verbal warn-
ings and summoning or providing medical aid. While it
includes a few protections, it fails to describe de-escalation,
proportionality, or any other more substantive means to pro-
tect citizens.
Other policies are still mostly symbolic, but they are also
substantive because they contain protections like de-escala-
tion. For example, the San Francisco Police Department use-
of-force policy contains all eighteen of our codes, which means
it included the broad, symbolic references to case law (which is
to be expected, as the basis of compliance); the basic, generic
protections (e.g., no shooting at vehicles); and also all of the
materially substantive protections (e.g., a force continuum, de-
escalation, and proportionality).149 In this way, San Fran-
cisco's policy represents an approach that engages the dis-
course of reasonableness while going beyond this
constitutional floor to provide meaningful protections to citi-
zens. Officers are instructed and incentivized to engage in af-
firmative conduct designed to reduce force, de-escalate, and
ultimately minimize harm.
Finally, some policies fall in between these two on the sym-
bolic versus substantive spectrum. While being primarily sym-
bolic, these policies might have some meaningful protections,
or at least one of the basic protections discussed above (e.g., no
shooting at vehicles). For example, the Cleveland Police De-
partment use-of-force policy includes the generic language of
reasonableness, but it also includes a discussion of de-escala-
tion, proportionality, all three basic protections, and require-
ments on intervention and reporting when officers use
excessive force.15 0 Thus, while engaging in the symbolism of
reasonableness, this kind of policy does include some substan-
tive policies that could deter excessive force by police.
148 See STOCKTON POLICE DEP'T, GENERAL ORDER Q-l: USE OF FORCE 1 (2015),
https://static 1.squarespace.com/static/56996151 cbced68b 170389f4/t/569bf
30b76d99c4f3919012d/ 1453060879155/Stockton+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7D87-NLEB].
149 See SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPT, supra note 107.
150 See CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE, supra note 92.
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While there is a range, our empirical findings demonstrate
that use-of-force policies show a managerial preference within
police departments. Since the regulated-here, the police-are
permitted to develop their own rules and restrictions, we can
see clear managerial preferences embedded throughout use-of-
force policies that protect organizational interests through the
appearance of legal compliance. When police create their own
rules and regulations and largely decline to include substantive
protections, they are able to protect their organizational inter-
ests when an incident of force might raise questions. Legal
endogeneity transforms use-of-force policies into devices that
can insulate the police from liability instead of protecting citi-
zens from constitutionally-violative excessive force. The next
subpart discusses the final step regarding the endogenous na-
ture of this process, whereby managerial preferences not only
shape use-of-force policies but are treated by federal courts as
articulations of legal compliance that shape the courts' own
understanding of what the Fourth Amendment requires.
C. Deference: How Judicial Processes Integrate
"Managerial Perspectives" into Use-of-Force
Policies
The final step in legal endogeneity theory is that the legal
system defers to organizations' symbolic compliance. In es-
sence, symbolic compliance as a managerial interpretation and
application of legality becomes law when courts and other legal
actors allow these policies to shape the meaning of legal con-
cepts. As Edelman puts it: "When organizational constructions
of compliance enter the judicial realm, law becomes endoge-
nous or influenced by the social fields that it seeks to regu-
late."15 1 The courts charged with finding violations of the law
"tend unwittingly to endorse symbolic structures without eval-
uating their effectiveness."'
52
In the excessive force context, the legal system legitimizes
the constitutional interpretations of law enforcement as ex-
pressed through their administrative policies concerning use of
force. Federal courts can internalize these efforts at compli-
ance and rearticulate them as an appropriate iteration of con-
stitutional law. This creates a dynamic in which symbolic
structures are not seen as "a means to achieve civil rights but
rather as the achievement of civil rights."153 Police departments
151 EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 170.
152 Id. at 39.
153 Id. at 217.
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and their advocates can point to use-of-force policies and con-
tend that the officer followed the protocols outlined in the pol-
icy; that the protocol is based on Supreme Court case law; and,
therefore, they are in compliance and no rights violation oc-
curred. When police refer to internal standards or say that an
officer followed protocol and therefore should not be held liable
for excessive force, the organization engages in the
"countermobilization of symbolic structures" to gesture toward
compliance. 
154
Edelman argues that adherence to symbolic structures oc-
curs along a spectrum, through "a process of reference, rele-
vance, and deference, which represent he progressive stages of
legal endogeneity."155 In practice, this looks like judges: (1)
incorporating or referring to organizational structures in their
opinions; (2) deciding organizational structures are relevant in
discerning whether a violation happened; and (3) deferring to
the "mere presence of symbolic structures."156 Hence, refer-
ence (entry into the "judicial lexicon") is the first stage of en-
dogeneity; relevance is the intermediate stage; and deference is
the most extreme form of endogeneity. 1
57
In this way, internal policies play an important role in con-
structing the judicial imagination of what compliance and vio-
lation look like in real time.1 58 We apply legal endogeneity
theory to contend that the judicial system completes the feed-
back loop by often ceding to use-of-force policies that validate
primarily symbolic rules that offer few protections for citizens.
These policies signal formal compliance with constitutional
protections and can be mobilized within this reference/rele-
vance/deference spectrum.159 A closer look at the different
ways this can occur appears below.
1. First Stage: Reference, Incorporation, and Entry into
Judicial Lexicon
At the lowest level of legal endogeneity, a judge refers to
and incorporates the policy into the opinion. While not neces-
154 Id at 37.
155 I& at 39-40.
156 Id at 40.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 168 ("Law becomes endogenous when official legal bodies like courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies defer to organizations' symbolic compli-
ance structures, thus condoning managerialized conceptions of law and
compliance.").
159 Edelman explains that "[when judges defer to symbolic structures without
evaluating their efficacy in achieving the goals of civil rights law, they usually do
so inadvertently." Id. at 219.
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sarily a highly relevant or an otherwise determinative factor, a
judge might include or mention a policy and therefore allow it
to enter the "judicial lexicon."160 This is the most basic way
that a use-of-force policy is included in judicial discussions of
excessive force. 16 1 "Reference" means that the policy is pointed
to as something worth being discussed, such as in one exces-
sive force case involving a K-9 where the Kern County Sheriff
Department's policy is described in the undisputed facts sec-
tion of the case. The court notes that "Kern County does not
have a custom of condoning the use of excessive force" and that
the department "has policies that govern the appropriate use of
police dogs." 1
6 2
In another example from Alabama, the administrator of the
estate of a man shot to death by police brought suit against the
City of Birmingham alleging that the deceased had his Fourth
Amendment rights violated, among others.1 63 In the opinion,
the court discusses how the officer "received training at the
Police Academy on dealing with a person with a mental illness
and on the City's Use-of-Force Policy," which "establishes and
regulates the amount of force a Birmingham police officer is
allowed to use in various situations."64 While the judge did
not necessarily defer to the policy, he nonetheless refers to it as
being an important fact in deciding the excessive force claim.
Lastly, as a third example, a California plaintiff brought an
excessive force claim. ' 6 5 In the section of the opinion reciting
160 Id. at 40.
161 See, e.g., Bettis v. Bean, No. 5:14-cv-113, 2015 WL 5725625, at *6 (D. Vt.
Sept. 29, 2015) (in the undisputed facts section of this case, which resulted in the
court granting summary judgment for the defendants, the court refers to the
department's policy, writing that "[t]he Montpelier Police Department's Use of
Force Policy provides that '[wihen the use of force is objectively reasonable the
degree of force employed should generally be in direct relationship to the amount
of resistance employed by the person or the immediate threat the person poses to
the officer or others.'.. . Under the Use of Force Policy, an officer 'must weigh the
circumstances of each case and employ only that amount of force which is objec-
tively reasonable to control the situation or persons.'" (citation omitted)); see also
Crowley v. Rosie, No. 2:13-cv-442-JHR, 2015 WL 5778603, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 30,
2015) (quoting the Farmington Police Department's use-of-force policy).
162 Brown v. County of Kern, No. 1:06-cv-00 121 -OWW-TAG, 2008 WL 544565,
at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008).
163 McElroy v. City of Bermingham, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1232 (N.D. Ala.
2012).
164 Id.
165 Gilbert v. Baldwin, No. 1:05-cv-1627-OWW-NEW (TAG), 2007 WL
3203021, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007). For a similar example, see also Jackson
v. Town of Waldoboro, 751 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267-68, 273 (D. Me. 2010) (noting
that "[a]ll Town police officers also receive training in the Police Department's
Policies and Standard Operating Procedures, including the Use of Force Policy"
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the "Defendants' Statements of Undisputed Facts," the court
includes that "the shooting was within Department policy and
consistent with current training standards for use of force by
peace officers in California" and the officer "followed appropri-
ate state law, department policies, and training as it relates to
the use of deadly force."16 6 The court held that "[n]o reasonable
officer would have responded differently" and that the officer
did not violate plaintiffs "right to be free from excessive
force."16 7 The court then refers to the use-of-force policy in
ultimately finding that there was no excessive force. 168 Noting
compliance with the policy signals that the court-at the very
least-found this to be an important fact in the case.
These examples demonstrate what it can look like when a
judge incorporates and refers to a force policy, allowing it to
enter the decision-making process to suggest constitutional
compliance. While the judges do not fully capitulate to the
policies in these examples, the policy is included as a reference
point that is part of the discussion.
2. Second Stage: Relevance in Discerning Violation
Second, judges might explicitly say that the force policy is
relevant in evaluating an instance of force usage.169 In one
case, the court discusses the relevance of the use-of-force pol-
icy (introduced by the police through testimony) for the fact-
finder to decide on the issue of excessive force.1 70 The court
characterizes the issue as "whether Officer Kerr's adherence to
[the city's] use of force policy is relevant to his decision to use
pepper spray on [plaintiff]."' 171 The court states that "an objec-
tively reasonable officer would consider his training," and
whether he followed the policy "is relevant evidence that the
finder of fact should consider in deciding whether Officer Kerr
and ultimately finding that the officer did not violate the constitutional rights of
the plaintiff).
166 Baldwin. 2007 WL 3203021, at *7.
167 I& at *13.
168 See id. at *14.
169 See, e.g., Russell v. Wright, 916 F. Supp. 2d 629, 644 (W.D. Va. 2013)
("ACSO's use of force policy authorizes taser use against subjects who are re-
sisting arrest, and targeting Russell's chest was in accordance with the training
Wright received on how to use the device. Additionally, Russell was given numer-
ous chances to comply with the officer's commands before any force was em-
ployed. As a result, Wright's conduct simply cannot be said to lack the 'slight
diligence' required to defeat a claim of gross negligence.").





was objectively reasonable" in his use of force.172 Hence, we
see the court concluding that a policy proffered by the defend-
ants is relevant in an excessive force claim.
In another excessive force case from Tennessee, the court
includes a long section in the opinion that contains numerous
references to the force policy. 173 The court describes how the
defense's expert (a "law enforcement consultant") "concluded
that the [police department's] use of force policy and use of
force continuum complied with Fourth Amendment stan-
dards."174 The court found that the "officers acted in accor-
dance with the [police department's] use of force policy,"175 and
ultimately the court held that the officers did not use excessive
force.176 In this case, we see the court not only mentioning a
policy, but finding it relevant and worth discussing at length.
We also see the court concluding that because a policy appears
to comply with Fourth Amendment standards, and because an
officer followed the policy, that the officer therefore complied
with the Fourth Amendment.
In a third example of relevance, an Ohio plaintiff was tased
and subsequently brought a § 1983 suit.1 7 7 The court dis-
cusses the fact that the town had "investigated this incident
and determined that [the officer] had complied with its Use of
Force Policy."1 7 8 The court stated that the policy "instructs
officers on 'constitutional adherence' in the use of force," to
"use reasonable force," and "provides the definition of reasona-
ble force specifically relying on the United States Supreme
Court case Graham v. Connor." Finally, the court wrote that
there is an "instructional Taser class" and that the officer not
only "completed the required training," but "was also certified
as a Taser instructor."1 79 In this decision, the court (1) gives
credence to the internal investigation; (2) evokes constitutional
adherence to Graham as if the case reflects a substantive con-
straint; and (3) includes the fact that the officer was a "certi-
fied" instructor. Thus, the court discusses the policy as a
172 ICL
173 Watson v. Dyersburg City Police Dep't, No. 08-2718-SHM-tmp, 2013 WL
5306683, at *16 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2013).
174 Id at *30.
175 Id. at *35.
176 Id. at *38.
177 Peabody v. Perry Tp., No. 2:10-cv-1078, 2013 WL 1327026, at *2 (S.D.
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relevant element in deciding the constitutionality of the force
used.
There are also instances where a court might invoke the
internal adjudicatory process of the police department and dis-
cuss the use-of-force policy in depth. In a case from Maine
involving the use of a Taser, the court states: "Ultimately, both
the Force Review Board and the internal affairs investigation
concluded that the use of the Taser was justified and in keep-
ing with departmental policy to overcome Parker's resistance to
being taken into lawful custody following his arrest for operat-
ing under the influence" and that the officer was acting within
"his department's use-of-force policy and applicable law."180
The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate
for most of the officers. 18 1
A district court in Phoenix deciding an excessive force
claim made a similar statement, using the following language:
"The City of Phoenix investigated and determined that [the of-
ficer's] actions were in compliance with the Phoenix Police De-
partment's use of force policy." 18 2 In another excessive force
case from California, after outlining the relevant portions of the
force policy, the court states that the actions of the officer were
"consistent and in compliance with Inyo County Sheriffs De-
partment training and policy" as well as "with the California
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training use of
force policy in California."
183
With these examples, the courts integrate use-of-force poli-
cies as relevant elements of a decision on excessive force, or
even describing the internal or municipal adjudicatory process
in relation to the policy. By allowing them to be incorporated in
this way, the courts permit use-of-force policies to-directly or
indirectly-evoke a sense of compliance through relevance. In
finding these policies relevant, the court allows organizational
structures (the policies) to be utilized by courts adjudicating
constitutional violations.
180 Parker v. City of South Portland, No. 06-129-P-S, 2007 WL 1468658, at * 13
(D. Me. May 18, 2007).
181 Id. at *29; see also Scott v. Deleon, No. 2:15-cv-02193, 2016 WL 9685994,
at * 1 (W.D. Ark., 2016) ("A use of force review was conducted and Defendant Kevin
Lindsey, who was at that time Chief of Police, determined that Deleon's use of
force in the sally port complied with Fort Smith Police Department policy.").
182 Remato v. City of Phoenix, No. cv 09-2027-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 3648268, at
*2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2011).
183 Gilbert v. Baldwin, No. cv-F-05-1627 OWW/GSA, 2007 WL 4126084, at *5
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007).
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3. Third Stage: Deference to the Presence of a Policy
On the far end of this spectrum, the court might fully defer
to a use-of-force policy in evaluating a claim of excessive
force. 18 4 In one case from Texas, the plaintiff brought suit after
an officer struck him in the knee in a manner that caused
significant injury, including a ruptured femoral artery. 18 5 The
court proceeded to directly and explicitly integrate the force
policy into its opinion on the excessive force claim, treating it
with substantial deference.
Under the Fort Worth Police Department's guidelines, a knee
strike is considered an intermediate use of force and not
deadly use of force or a technique that could cause serious
injury. Thus, although [the plaintiff] suffered a severe injury
that may have resulted from [the officer's] use of the knee
strike, that injury will not color the Court's analysis as to the
reasonableness of the use of that technique. To allow such
an influence would bias the objective review of the officer's
use of force with 20/20 hindsight. Under the circumstances
of this case, and resisting the temptations of 20/20 hind-
sight, the Court concludes that the officers [sic] use of force
was not excessive. 1
8 6
By invoking the policy, the court makes it an integral part
of the decision-making process beyond mere reference or ele-
vance; it largely constitutes the holding. What is also interest-
ing here is that the court invokes the "20/20 hindsight"
element of Graham, in combination with the policy, to find that
the instance of force was not excessive. The court thereby ab-
solves itself of analytical responsibility beyond the generalized
rehashing of Graham's vagueness alongside the police depart-
ment's own interpretation of the Graham standard. The court
goes on:
According to the police department's guidelines, this level of
force is appropriate "when the officer meets an actively re-
sisting subject who represents a physical threat to the safety
of the officer or attempts to use force against the officer or
another but does not yet represent a life-endangering threat."
Faced with just such a situation, the officers used the appro-
184 EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 173 ("When judges defer to symbolic struc-
tures, it means that they have failed to engage in adequate scrutiny of these
structures.").
185 Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, No. 4:06-CV-332-Y, 2008 WL 440301, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2008).
186 Id. at *10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
1328 [Vol. 104:1281
20191 THE ENDOGENOUS FOURTH AMENDMENT
priate level of force to protect their safety and minimize [the
plaintiff sI potential threat. 
187
By directly discussing the force policy, the court indicates
its centrality and magnitude in its decision. More than just
referencing it or discussing its relevance, the policy is inte-
grated into the holding as a critical piece of the court's deci-
sion-making process. The force policy is thereby part of the
meaning-making application of law.
In a second example from West Virginia, the court holds
that the officer's conduct was "objectively reasonable," simi-
larly pointing directly to the force policy in its holding. 1 88 The
court states: "Officer Hennessey acted reasonably under the
circumstances to protect both [the plaintiff] and himself, in
accordance with the Morgantown City Police Department's Use
of Force policy" and therefore "did not violate [the plaintiffs]
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure."189 As we see here, the court cites the force policy
explicitly as part of its holding that the force was reasonable.
The presence of the force policy is effectively equated to compli-
ance with the Fourth Amendment.
A third example of this process can be seen in a wrongful
death suit brought by the parents of a Wisconsin man shot and
killed by police in front of his house. 190 In this case, the court
wrote that pursuant to the "law at the time of the incident, as
well as the policies for both law enforcement agencies, permit-
ted the use of deadly force under certain circumstances."19 1
The Court also noted that since it "agree[d] that other police,
confronted with the same situation, would find that the force
used by the defendants was reasonable, the defendants [were]
shielded from this action under the principles of qualified im-
munity."'192 The court places the use-of-force policies on the
same level as the law to demonstrate their significance in un-
187 Id. (emphasis added).
188 Neiswonger v. Hennessey, 89 F. Supp. 2d 766, 774 (N.D. W.Va. 2000).
189 Id.; see also Alicea v. Schweizer, No. CIV.A. 14-0213, 2015 WL 4770680, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2015) (discussing the training officers received on the police
department's "rules and directives, including the use of force policy" in finding
that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law); McElroy v. City of
Birmingham, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2012) ("Officer Hutchins
received training at the Police Academy on dealing with a person with a mental
illness and on the City's Use-of-Force Policy .... The City's Use-of-Force Policy
establishes and regulates the amount of force a Birmingham police officer is
allowed to use in various situations." (citation omitted)).
190 Liebenstein v. Crowe, 826 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
191 Id. at 1186 (emphasis added).
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derstanding the constitutionality of the use of force. In finding
the force used within the realm of what is constitutionally per-
missible (via qualified immunity), the court defers to the policy.
In these cases, federal courts effectively defer to the pres-
ence of a policy as signaling compliance with the Fourth
Amendment. The presence of the policy thwarts the plaintiffs'
claims that the force used against them violated the Fourth
Amendment. The courts include use-of-force policies as part of
or leading to the holding, indicating that the importance of the
policy goes beyond reference or relevance. As such, federal
courts give credence to these policies, allowing the embedded
managerial preferences to effectively become Fourth Amend-
ment standards with regards to excessive force inquiries.
These examples of reference, relevance, and deference al-
low us to see how the legal system engages with use-of-force
policies in a manner that validates and valorizes the policies as
indicative of compliance with constitutional mandates. This is
the last stage of endogeneity, i.e., the final step in the process
through which the regulated actor defines the terms and condi-
tions of legal compliance. As Edelman notes, "when courts-as
well as other legal institutions-rely on myth and ceremony...
rights themselves become merely symbolic." 19 3
This legal analysis along with our data on use-of-force poli-
cies suggests that Fourth Amendment considerations of exces-
sive force are not the exogenous process many consider them to
be, and that police can exert their own conceptualizations of
the law through use-of-force policies that are seen as relevant,
used as reference points, or deferred to by federal courts.
Law-and the meaning of law-rarely exists outside of real
sociolegal structures of interpretation and manifestation.
Through these use-of-force policies, there is a process of
knowledge production in which symbolic structures advocating
police/managerial preferences become constitutional aw and
truncate the rights of those the Fourth Amendment is sup-
posed to protect-the public.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF USE-OF-
FORCE POLICIES
This Article provides empirical evidence on use-of-force
policies that gives rise to a new way of conceptualizing exces-
sive force claims under the Fourth Amendment. Contrary to
traditional understandings that frame the Fourth Amendment
193 EDELMAN, supra note 13, 217.
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as an exogenous determinant for how police understand their
use-of-force responsibilities, our data and analysis suggest
that use-of-force policies often reflect an endogenous process.
Ambiguous doctrine and case law allow police departments to
define what is reasonable through their own administrative
preferences which become a symbolic structure of compliance
that federal courts come to refer, rely upon, or defer to in un-
derstanding what the Constitution requires. Thus, Fourth
Amendment reasonableness i not merely defined by external
legal mechanisms like constitutional text or judicial decisions,
but also shaped endogenously by police departments and their
use-of-force policies. The refraining offered by this Article pro-
vides a new understanding for how and why the Fourth
Amendment has been ineffective in curbing excessive and
deadly force by the police or holding them accountable after the
fact.
While the empirical study of use-of-force policies opens up
new possibilities for thinking about the relationship between
police administrative policies and constitutional law, it is not
without limitations. Not all Fourth Amendment excessive force
cases refer to or incorporate use-of-force policies. This Article
is interested in those instances in which they do and how, if at
all, courts treat these policies when discussed in their deci-
sions. Moreover, police excessive force claims are decided
through diverse means; no one explanation captures every dy-
namic. Yet, by empirically examining use-of-force policies and
how they are used in judicial decisions, we are able to have a
sense of the bottom up pressures that can shape courts' under-
standings of what counts as excessive force.
This Article focuses on performing the preliminary empiri-
cal work to identify a dynamic between the Fourth Amendment,
excessive force jurisprudence, and police administrative poli-
cies that has not been discussed in the literature and under-
standing how the policy preferences of police departments can
become constitutional standards adhered to by federal courts.
It is our intent that this Article serves as the beginning of a
scholarly conversation on the diverse implications of these
findings. We anticipate that future studies can uncover under-
lying patterns of judicial deference to use-of-force policies
across various time periods or make comparative claims about
legal endogeneity theory in civil and criminal contexts. Such
research can make important contributions to understanding
how and why police violence persists in many communities.
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Understanding the endogenous relationship between use-
of-force policies and federal courts' conceptions of excessive
force also creates new possibilities for reform in reducing the
instances of police brutality in the communities they serve. In
addition to encouraging federal courts to be more specific in
how they characterize and define appropriate versus excessive
force, our key recommendation is that use-of-force policies
must become radically democratic documents that allow di-
verse constituencies to participate in their creation.
There are approximately 18,000 police agencies in the
United States, each of which has the power to define its use-of-
force policy. 19 4 A combination of the Black Lives Matter move-
ment, consent decrees, and an active Department of Justice
during the Obama Administration put pressure on police de-
partments to reform their use-of-force policies over the past
several years 19 5-from Las Vegas1 96 to Baton Rouge
197 to Ashe-
ville. 19 8 Other locales voluntarily responded in the face of civil-
ian pressure, such as in St. Paul. 19 9  Members of the
community can offer recommendations and feedback in an ad-
visory committee or a public comment period, and a consent
decree may tell a department to specifically do something like
focus on de-escalation.20 0 In Denver, for instance, after the
194 The Editorial Board, Adopt Uniform Police Use-of-Force Policies, USA TODAY
(July 11, 2017, 10:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/07/
10 /adopt-unform-police-use-of-force-policies/425162001/ [https: //perma.cc/
RK4P-9D3E].
195 Cecil Bothwell, BothwelL Police Reforms Are Already Working, CITIZEN TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2018, 7:18 AM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/opinion/
2 018/
03/1 6/bothwell-police-reforms-already-working/429617002/ [https://perma.
cc/V4L2-7TLN]; Cheryl Corley, New Use-of-Force Guidelines for Chicago Police,
NPR (Oct. 14, 2017, 7:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/14/5578
3 2 705 /
new-use-of-force-guidelines-for-chicago-police [https: //perma.cc/LD2Q-AQ881;
Jessica Anderson, Team Overseeing Consent Decree Sets Deadlines for Baltimore
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UNE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:28 PM), http://www.startribune.com/st-paul-police-re
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police department failed to sufficiently involve the community,
an advisory committee of community members participated in
updating the rules in 2017.201
The San Francisco Police Department approved an up-
dated policy in 2016 after not having done so since 1995.202
This new policy features all of the substantive protections dis-
cussed in Part 111.203 The process of updating the policy hap-
pened, at least in part, due to the killing of Mario Woods. It was
launched based on a mayoral initiative and involved discus-
sions with numerous stakeholders, including the San Fran-
cisco Police Department, the San Francisco Police Officers
Association, the Board of Supervisors, the San Francisco Police
Commission, and community members.20 4 The Police Com-
mission's then-President stated: "The people of San Francisco
have demanded that we make meaningful change.2 05
In addition, Chicago-a department with a use-of-force
policy with many key protections-similarly faced public and
federal pressures to change. In early 2017, the DOJ released a
highly critical report of the Chicago Police Department's exces-
sive use of force and continuous violation of citizen's civil
rights.2° 6 The DOJ's investigation started after the death of
201 Jesse Paul, New Use-of-Force Policies for Denver Police Officers Will Take
Months of Training, Deputy Chief Warns City Council Members, DENV. POST (Dec.
20, 2017, 2:39 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/12/20/denver-police-
use-of-force-policy-training/ [https://perma.cc/S8VZ-GR6Q]; Noelle Phillips,
Denver Police Chief Reverses Course, Plans to Invite Outside Voices to Finalize New
Use-of-Force Policy, DENV. POST (Feb. 27, 2017, 3:43 PM), https://www.denver
post.com/2017/02/27/robert-white-advisory-panel-use-of-force-policy/ [https:/
/perma.cc/H92G-BKXH].
202 San Francisco Police Commission Approves New Use of Force Policy, CBS
(Dec. 21, 2016, 11:09 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2016/12/21/
shooting-at-moving-vehicles-banned-in-new-sfpd-use-of-force-policy/ [https://
perma.cc/8V9H-D4R6].
203 See discussion supra Part III.
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Passed by Police Commission, S.F. EXAMINER (June 22, 2016, 12: 00 AM), http://
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Laquan McDonald, a Black teenager shot sixteen times by Chi-
cago police as he was walking away.20 7 As a result, in May of
2017, the Chicago Police Department announced stricter use-
of-force rules that focus on firearm restrictions, de-escalation,
and requiring officers to seek medical attention for citizens af-
ter using force.20 8 According to Chicago Police Superintendent
Eddie Johnson, the policy incorporated input from citizens
through community meetings, two public comment periods,
and focus groups with officers and police supervisors.
20 9
Thus, mounting pressure from the public and federal gov-
ernment over the past five years has had the effect of increasing
community involvement in the process of producing new ad-
ministrative rules and regulations. In order to break the cycle
of legal endogeneity that allows police departments to develop
policies that are favorable to police and less attentive to the
wellbeing of community members, cities and municipalities
must find ways to ensure that the public is deeply involved in
developing community standards to define what is reasonable
and how they expect their police departments to use force.
Given the remarkably high stakes, this democratization of use-
of-force policies must go beyond mere city council meetings
and public discussions to find novel ways for community mem-
bers to have permanent roles in defining and implementing
standards that can guide officer decision making and hold po-
lice accountable when standards are not met.
In addition to initiating conversations concerning reform, it
is also our hope that scholars will view this Article as an invita-
tion to think more sociologically in understanding the social
and organizational forces that endogenously create law as op-
posed to treating law as an entity that exists anterior to social
relations. While legal endogeneity has been well received as a
theory for understanding dynamics surrounding organiza-
see also Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Chicago Police Routinely Trampled on Civil
Rights, Justice Dept. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytmes.com/
2017/01 / 13/us/chicago-police-justice-department-report.htmll [https: //perna.
cc/KR66-HRRS]; Corley, supra note 195.
207 Mitch Smith, Sweeping Limits on Police Use of Weapons Proposed in Chi-
cago, N.Y. TIMEls (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/1O/08/us/chi
cago-police-guns-force.html [https: //perma.cc/CG54-58FV].
208 Mitch Smith & Timothy Williams, Chicago Police Adopt New Limits on Use
of Force, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/
chicago-police-force- shooting.html [https: //perma.cc/8E33-AHBWI.
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tional behavior and statutory laws,2 10 we invite scholars to
apply this same type of sociological thinking to understanding
various aspects of public law. Taking this approach might cre-
ate new ways for considering whether our commitments to the
rule of law and a just and fair society are being met.
210 Edelman's Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights
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